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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis we focus on how previous activation of the representation of an 
emotional state impacts the processing of subsequent emotional information (within a priming 
paradigm). Our approach is guided by an embodied perspective on cognition. According to 
embodied cognition theories, affective representations are partial simulations of emotional 
experience (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Among other 
simulations, re-enacting an emotion may involve the activation of correspondent facial motor 
activation. In the present work, we directly approach the hypothesis that facial muscle 
activation has a role in emotional category priming effects within a blocking paradigm. 
However, because blocking may still allow partial muscle activity, we first address muscular 
specificities of a facial muscular blocking procedure. 
Our first experimental approaches aimed to  establish the proper methodology used to 
test our hypothesis. Experiment 1 addresses our hypothesis within an emotional category 
priming paradigm similar to the one used by Carroll and Young (2005) and, establishes the 
proper temporal window to observe the effect. Resutls show a general emotional priming 
effect, such that all emotional faces impacted all, and only, emotional targets judgment (both 
congruent and incongruent). This indicates that perceiving emotional primes facilitates 
emotional judgments of emotional stimuli in general.  
Our second Experiment aimed to define the muscular specificities of a blocking 
procedure (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001) necessary to address the role 
of muscle activation in the observed priming effects. Assuming that the blocking procedure 
may exert different influences on different muscle’s activation, we  characterized this 
procedure in terms of promotion of muscle activation over zygomaticus major, orbicularis 
oris and corrugator supercilii. Results corroborate that blocking exerts different effect for 
different muscles, suggesting that its effect on emotion priming effects may be moderated by 
the type of emotion primed. 
Experiment 3, replicated the procedure of Experiment 1, including an additional 
blocking condition, in order to test the embodiment hypothesis. In this experiment, as well as 
a general emotion priming effect, we also found some evidence of category emotional 
priming effects qualified by type of emotion. There was a clear congruency effect for 
happiness, and a generalized effect for sadness (both for congruent and incongruent trials). As 
expected, these effects suffered an interference from the facial muscle blocking manipulation 
(Niedenthal et al., 2001). This supports the hypothesis that muscle facial activation plays a 
role in the mechanism through which emotional category priming effect occurs. However, 
under blocking conditions, priming effects only disappeared for happy prime-target pairs. 
Priming effects became stronger for sadness and anger. These differences seem to be 
explained by the fact that the blocking procedure (Experiment 2, 4 and 5) has a preponderant 
blocking impact over the zygomaticus major (the muscle of smiling), and a different impact 
over muscles associated with other emotions. As it becomes more clear in Experiment 4 and 
5,  blocking manipulation increased the variability observed in the orbicularis oris, activation. 
We, thus argue that these different effects of blocking explain why negative emotions may 
have had a stronger priming effect in Experiment 3, under blocking. 
Results are discussed in terms of implications for embodiment theories and in terms of 
methodological implications for futher research making use of blocking procedures. 
 
Keywords: Embodiment; priming; facial expression; blocking 
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Overview 
 
Processing emotional information is a task we perform more or less automatically in 
our daily lives. In looking people’s faces we are able to perceive their emotional experiences 
seemingly effortlessly and this is shown in an impressive number of studies (Buck, 1988; 
Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1982; Ellison & Massaro, 1997; Fridlund, 1992; Frijda, 1969; Izard, 
1980; Russell & Bullock, 1986; Wallbott & Ricci-Bitti, 1993; Young, Rowland, Calder, & 
Etcoff, 1997). In this thesis we focus one of the factors that is related with how we perform 
this kind of task, and how we do it more or less easily: previous activation of the emotional 
state in ourselves (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001; Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, Margolin, & Innes-Ker, 2000). On studying this issue we focus on what an 
emotion is and how we are able to perceive it in others. 
Several lines of research focus on the processing of emotional stimuli from different 
perspectives on the cognitive representation of emotions. According to a number of authors 
(see Bower, 1981; Ingram, 1984; see Niedenthal, 2008 for a review; Teasdale, 1983), the 
representation of emotion is similar to the representation of any other concept (e.g. as 
semantic associative networks). However, as other authors (e.g. Lang, 1984; Niedenthal, 
Setterlund, & Jones, 1994), early noticed,  there are some limitations of those semantic 
network models in explaining the complexity of emotional information. The components of 
emotion knowledge such as bodily aspects or physiologic activation seem to be well 
accounted by modern embodied theories (Barsalou, 1999; Clore & Schnall, 2008; Damasio, 
1999; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gallese, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Semin & Cacioppo, 2008). Because of this, in the 
present thesis, we endorse this perspective. This perspective holds that representations in 
general and representations of emotion in particular involve the process of re-enacting and 
integrating modality-specific states (in motor, somatosensory, affective and reward systems 
that stands for the meaning of the emotion) generated during the original experience of the 
concept or emotion (Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010), rather than re-
describing them into abstract symbols that represent referents.  
Embodied approaches to emotion perception have suggested that it may involve a 
motor simulation of the observed facial expression in the percipient’s face (motor 
simulation). Here we focus on this as a possible mechanism that explains why previous 
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activation of an emotion in the perceiver may facilitate perception of others’ emotional 
expressions. In fact, a number of reported findings suggest that mimicry plays an important 
role in the perception of other’s facial expression (Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman, 
Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007; Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008) although several 
recent studies suggest that  mimicry is not a necessary condition for emotion perception 
(Adolphs, 2002; Calder, Keane, Cole, Campbell, & Young, 2000; Keillor, Barrett, Crucian, 
Kortenkamp, & Heilman, 2002; McIntosh, 2006) because  contextual effects of previous 
knowledge or expectancies may play a role when simulation is not able to occur (Niedenthal 
et al., 2010). 
 By focusing on previous activation of emotional components (the emotional concept 
or muscles’ activation) in emotional perception we helped to clarify the assumptions made 
by the embodied perspective (Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008, for a review) and 
take a critical view of one of its most relevant methodological procedures: the blocking 
mimicry procedure (Niedenthal et al., 2001). 
In order to motivate the present research, in Chapter I we explore the notion of 
affective representation and how it is conceived within an embodied perspective. Chapter II 
focuses on the effect known as emotional category based priming, which shows how the 
previous activation of an emotion feature interferes with the perception of subsequent 
emotional stimuli. We give special attention to the previous activation of facial muscles (one 
of such features), and develop the idea that prior activation of muscles relevant to an 
emotion can be a mechanism that explains affective priming phenomena. Chapter III aims to 
introduce the reader to one of the most popular methodological procedures to study facial 
muscle activation role on concept’s perception: the blocking of facial expressions. 
In Section II, we then present a set of empirical studies, designed to establish whether 
embodied approach engaging facial muscle activation can account for emotional priming 
phenomena.  The first experiment establishes a temporal window in which a category based 
emotional priming effect can be found, allowing the test of our hypothesis by the use of a 
muscle blocking paradigm. We expected that by blocking muscle activity we would change 
the pattern of the observed priming effects. Before running an experiment providing 
evidence that mimicry has a role on that effect we wanted to understand the muscular 
specificities of a blocking procedure (Niedenthal et al., 2001).  A pre-test  was therefore 
conducted on the consequences of the blocking manipulation for muscular activation as 
assessed by EMG. This study characterize the blocking procedure in terms of promotion of 
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muscle activation over zygomaticus major, orbicularis oris and corrugator supercilii (hyper 
or hipoactivation). Experiment 3 replciates Experiment 1 adding to it a blocking condition 
and the two subsequent studies explored other blocking effects on muscle activity in order to 
better understand the mechanism through which the manipulation produced different results 
across different emotions in the priming task. 
The dissertation then ends with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical issues 
related to our studies, integrating them in the knowledge already established and in questions 
to be explored in the future. 
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Chapter I: Emotion representations and emotion perception 
 
Perceiving is a process that involves the activation of previous knowledge (Postman, 
Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948).  Perception of an emotion is not an exception. Our knowledge 
of what an emotion is and what constitutes as specific category of emotions guides our 
perceptions. But how is  that knowledge accessed when we perceive an emotion on another’s 
face?  
The answer to this question is not straightforward. It is dependent upon how we 
conceive knowledge representation. In the present chapter we discuss the notion of affective 
representation and how it is conceived from an embodied perspective. Within this 
framework we introduce the emotional category based priming effect, giving special 
attention to the prior activation of facial muscles. 
 
The representation of emotions 
Pure cognitive approaches to emotional information processing have argued that 
emotion information is no different from other cognitive information. One such approach is 
represented by the semantic information models. In this group of models: semantic network 
models of emotion (see Bower, 1981; Ingram, 1984; see Niedenthal, 2008 for a review; 
Teasdale, 1983), assumes units of representation - concepts (also called nodes) that 
transduce information in propositional form. Each emotion is represented by a set of nodes. 
Nodes are linked by pathways that reflect the strength of their semantic association (Collins 
& Quillian, 1969). When an emotion is experienced, a relevant node is activated and this 
activation spreads to associated nodes, which can be bodily features of the emotion, its 
antecedents or other related features.  
Cognitive theories have in common the idea that representations are amodal, not 
preserving analogical features of the perceptual experience. Representations result from the 
process of redescribing the modality-specific states, generated during the original 
experience, into abstract symbols that represent referents (Barsalou, 1999). Emotional 
representation contents, in these pure cognitive models, such as eliciting stimulus, meaning, 
and emotional responses are stored in a propositional form, which means that an internal 
symbol stands for a referent which is an internal or external experience previously occurred 
(Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Zajonc & Markus, 1984). Even physiological response patterns 
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that are known to occur in emotional experiences are assumed to be stored in a proposition-
based network.  
Pure cognitive models of emotion representations have been criticized (e.g. Isen, 
1984; see Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986  for discussion) for their poor account of the 
richness of emotional experience with the assumption that it is plausible that codes other 
than propositional may preserve somatosensory aspects of experience. Cognitive models lose 
their power by assuming this somatosensory experience rising from a bidirectional link 
(Bower, 1981), which signal a potential activation of physiological patterns and subjective 
state through emotional thoughts and vice versa. This would mean that words and ideas 
about emotions should activate emotions themselves (Lang, 1984). Emotions are not always 
primed by words or propositions referring to them (Niedenthal et al., 1994). 
An alternative view is offered by embodied theories of cognition. The general idea of 
these models is that representations of knowledge are grounded in modality-specific systems 
(Barsalou, 1999; Clore & Schnall, 2008; Damasio, 1999; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gallese, 
2003; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Semin & Cacioppo, 2008). When the concept 
is activated, this would involve a partial simulation of the original state generated during the 
experience with the object (those could be introspective states, perceptual states or motor 
states). In this approach, processing emotionally charged information involves reactivating 
part of neural states that occurred when one experienced that emotion or processed a 
particular emotional cue (Niedenthal, 2007).  As an example, activating the concept of 
happiness, would involve simulating happiness itself, including its somatosensory 
manifestations such as its specific mimicry, postural features (upright position), and so forth. 
Evidence supporting an embodiment approach relative to a pure cognitive one, rises 
from different fields focusing somatosensory: a) impact on emotions; b) activation in 
perception of emotions and c) activation by emotional constructs.  
 
Somatosensory impact on emotion. Various studies have shown that embodied 
simulation can have an impact on the emotional state of the inidvidual. One modality of 
simulation specifically relevant in the case of emotions is facial mimicry. Two facial 
muscles are frequently manipulated, in this respect. The zygomaticus (which pushes up lip 
corners to create a smile) and the corrugator supercilii (which knits the eyebrows to form a 
frown) which are involved in, respectively, a positive and a negative reaction (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Dimberg, 1990). Several studies have suggested that the 
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contraction of facial muscles is able to initiate/ modulate the subjective experience of the 
individual. This facial feedback hypothesis (for a review see Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; 
McIntosh, 1996) was tested by experiments that induced participants to pose or suppress a 
facial expression. These studies have shown that different facial expressions influence both 
the reports of what emotions are felt and their physiological responses. In one of such studies 
Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith and Kleck (1976) submitted the participants to series of 
electrical shocks that varied in terms of intensity, and which aversiveness was announced 
before its administration. Half of them were asked to suppress or to exaggerate the facial 
expression during the announcement period. Both self-reports of shock painfulness and skin 
conductance were measured. Findings showed that the concealing of expressive responses 
decreased the magnitude of skin conductance changes and subjective reports of painfulness 
relative to the free expression or exaggeration conditions (see also, Kopel & Arkowitz, 
1974). In another study, (Laird, 1974) participants were instructed to adopt facial displays 
(of happiness and anger) while they watched positive and negative slides. The instructions 
that induced facial expression did not mention the term facial expression or any association 
with emotions, leading participants to believe the experiment concerned “the activity of 
facial muscles under various conditions” during perception. The participants were attached 
to electrodes allegedly measuring muscular activity. For anger expressions the participants 
were requested to “touch lightly the electrodes between the eyebrows”, then to contract these 
muscles. After this, they were asked to “touch lightly the electrodes at the corners of the jaw 
and then contract these”. For inducing the happy pose, the participants were instructed to 
“touch lightly the electrodes near the corners of the mouth and contract these muscles”. 
Findings showed that smiling participants felt happier when viewing positive slides 
(children playing) and frowning participants felt more anger when viewing negative slides 
(members of the Ku Klux Klan). However mismatching pairs of expressions and slides 
produced an attenuation of participants’ feelings.  
Another study that provides evidence in favour of the feedback hypothesis is the 
already classic of Strack’s team (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). It was this work that 
introduced the procedure of inducing facial expression, by asking participants to put a pen in 
the mouth, with its top out, while holding it with the teeth (inducing a smile) or with the lips 
(preventing the smile). While performing this task, individuals were exposed to a humorous 
cartoon. Participants reported increased amusement while covertly induced to smile (teeth 
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condition) than in the lip condition. A comparable procedure was also tried with negative 
emotions by Larsen, Kasimatis, and Frey (1992), who attached two golf tees to participant’s 
brow region, specifically above the inner corner of the eye. In order to produce a sad facial 
expression, the participants were instructed to try to bring the ends of the tees together. 
When an inhibition of sad expression was required, the instruction involved keeping the ends 
of the golf tees apart from each other. This task was performed while participants were 
exposed to unpleasant slides, which caused the participants to feel sadder when accompanied 
by the instruction to bring the tees together, that is, the production of a sad expression. 
 Another set of experiments extended the type of emotions that can be induced by 
facial feedback. Duclos, Laird, Schneider, Sexter, Stern, and Van Lighten (1989) gave 
participants instructions that covertly induced facial expressions of fear, anger, disgust, and 
sadness while they were exposed to neutral tones. In all cases, the expressions were 
generated by a muscle-by-muscle contraction induction. Subsequently participants rated 
their feelings on emotion scales. As predicted by a facial feedback account, each expression 
increased the self report of feelings of its particular emotion compared to the remaining. 
 The impact of muscle activation in reported emotions has a ecological version in 
Zajonc, Murphy and Inglehart (1989) study. In this study participants had to pronounce 
among other control sounds, the vowel ü, which should inhibit smile or e than should result 
in a muscle configuration similar to a smile. The authors found that participants who had the 
task to pronounce the sound ü reported worse mood, compared to those in the control 
condition (who pronounced o) and in the e condition. Those who pronounced e as well as 
reported better moods than ü, also differed from controls. 
 Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the activation of a somatosensory 
state is able to trigger by itself an emotional experience or bias it. This is consistent with the 
general idea of the embodied perspective that holds that emotional experience could be 
grounded in a previous partial re-enaction of a modality-specific state (such as facial motor 
behaviour in this case).  
 
Somatosensory activation role on the perception of emotions. Evidence that 
somatosensory activation exerts a role in perception of emotions comes from the studies that 
suggest mimicry has a role in our ability to perceive other’s emotions (Niedenthal et al., 
2001; Oberman et al., 2007; Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008). Strong evidence of this is 
presented by, Dimberg (Dimberg, 1982, 1990, 1997; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995), whose 
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studies have demonstrated that perception of an emotional face activates muscular activity in 
the perceiver. In an initial experiment (Dimberg, 1982) participants were exposed 
supraliminarly to series of happy and angry emotional facial expressions. The results 
revealed an increased zygomatic region’s (associated to smile) activity to happy stimuli and 
increased corrugator region’s (associated to frown) activity to angry stimuli. The experiment 
was replicated with subliminal exposures of the emotional expressions (Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal, 
2002) suggesting that the effect has the characteristics of an automatic process. This 
automaticity received further support in Dimberg and colleagues’ (2002) study. In this study 
participants were presented with pictures of facial expressions (that could be of anger or 
happiness) and asked either to react or not to them immediately. The reactions consisted in 
wrinkling eyebrows (promoting a frown) or elevating the cheeks (promoting a smile). Faster 
responding to the stimuli occurred when the facial instruction matched the facial expression 
in the picture. Relevant to the argument of automaticity, even when subjects were told not to 
react, electromyographic activity was differentiated over the corrugator and zygomaticus as 
a function of the emotion that was being perceived. 
 Along with these correlational data pointing to the involvement of mimicry in the 
perception of facial expressions, there is also causal evidence that this activation facilitates 
perception of emotional facial expressions (Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman et al., 2007; 
Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008). Niedenthal and colleagues (2001) reported  evidence of the 
role of mimicry in the perception of facial expression in a study in which participants were 
requested to identify the transition point of a face in a morph video moving from one facial 
expression (happy) to a different one (sad) and vice versa. During this task, one group of 
participants was prevented from mimicking with a procedure that involved holding a pen 
sideways with teeth and lips slightly. The other half was free to mimic. Participants whose 
mimicry was blocked by the pen procedure were less efficient in detecting the transition of 
the facial expression, such that this change was detected later than the group of participants 
who was free to mimic. This result supports the claim that mimicry has a role in the 
recognition of facial expressions. Oberman and colleagues (2007) also found supportive 
evidence for the role of muscle activity in perception of another’s smile. These researchers 
exposed participants to a set of pictures conveying happiness, sadness, fear and disgust at 
different levels of intensity, each one for a duration of 500ms. Participants performed a 
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forced-choice identification task. Results showed that participants were more accurate at 
recognizing smiling but not other facial expressions when mimicry was free than for 
mimicry was blocked. Also using a mimicry constraining paradigm, Stel and Knippenberg, 
(2008) presented participants with photos of individuals expressing positive and negative 
emotions for 67ms each. Subjects judged the valence of the expression by pushing a button 
corresponding to positive emotion vs. negative emotion. Participants who were instructed to 
clench their teeth were slower in making a response, than those who were free to mimic.  
 Together these studies add support to the claim that mimicry has a role in processing, 
this time not in the triggering of emotion itself but in its perception.  
However this role does not seems to be one of a “necessary condition”. In fact some 
evidence shows that mimicry is not a necessary condition to emotion recognition. Blairy, 
Herrera and Hess (1999) developed an experiment in which participants rated a series of 
videos of persons expressing anger, sadness, disgust, and happiness. EMG activity was 
recorded over muscles relevant for each emotion. Although this measurement revealed that 
participants mimicked all types of expressions, a mediational analyses did not reveal a 
relationship between mimicry and emotion recognition. Consistent with this claim is the 
behaviour observed in autistic individuals. Whereas McIntosh and colleagues (McIntosh, 
Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger, 2006) showed that  autistic individuals, 
when confronted with happy and angry photos, do not spontaneously mimic them, Spezio 
and colleagues (Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007) observed that they are able as 
normal individuals to categorize facial expressions. The fact that this individuals do not 
spontaneously mimic, but are able to recognize emotions casts doubt in the role of mimicry 
for the process, reinforcing the idea that mimic does not seem to be a pre-requisite to 
perceive other’s emotions. 
Further support for this doubt is offered by studies with participants with facial 
paralysis (e.g. Calder et al., 2000a; Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Keillor 
et al., 2002). For example, Calder and his team (2000) worked with subjects with Moebius 
Syndrome. These individuals did not reveal increased level of errors in recognizing  static 
photographs (in a forced choice task) or vocal expressions of six basic emotions (happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise) compared to controls.  
Because they imply that mimicry is not a necessary condition to emotion recognition, 
these studies raised the question of when individuals use facial simulation and when they use 
other cues (perceptual cues, experiential cues, and conceptual knowledge) to interpret facial 
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expressions. This question is in the root of the emergence of SIMS model (Niedenthal et al., 
2010) which focuses on the particular case of the interpretation of smiles. The SIMS model 
states that the perception of a smile activates the amygdala, which in turn increases the 
probability of eye contact, which will be responsible for triggering the embodied simulation. 
However, there are many situations in which eye contact is not achieved, or mimicry is 
inhibited, for experimental or social reasons. In those cases, processing focus on perceptive 
features of the smile is in charge, and the individuals perform a match between the perceived 
smile and stored perceptual representation of previous experienced smiles. In cases, such as 
in socially inhibited mimicry, it may be that simulation is not completely impaired, so that 
conceptual knowledge may influence judgment via embodied simulation. 
 
Somatosensory activation by emotional constructs. The emotional lexicon is also 
able to preserve something about the actual experience of emotion. This is suggested by 
work of Mendolia and Kleck (1993) who observed that the manner in which a person 
describes an event shapes the reaction to the same event in a later point in time. Also 
Halberstadt and Niedenthal (2001) demonstrated that perceptual memory for ambiguous 
facial expressions was influenced by the presence of a word label accompanying the 
previous exposure to the face (Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 2001). These studies seen from the 
embodiment sight, point out the possibility of words being simulators of emotional states. 
Concerning specifically the motor reenaction of an emotion, Larsen, Norris and 
Cacioppo (2003) showed that lexical stimuli are able to elicit motor resonance exposing 
participants to series of positive and negative words (6 seconds each) where no other task 
was requested during the exposure, except that EMG activity over the zygomaticus and 
corrugator was recorded. The experiment supported the conclusion that positive valenced 
words were able to exert inhibition over the corrugator and negative words over the 
zygomaticus. In addition to this also Foroni and Semin (2009) tested the supraliminal 
exposure, to words, this time, focusing on positive and negative representing the facial 
expressions of two specific emotions (i.e., to smile, to frown) or states associated with these 
expressions (e.g. happy, angry). For the purpose, EMG activity was also recorded for 
zygomaticus and corrugator. The measurement revealed a correspondence between greater 
activation of the zygomaticus for the positive words and greater activation of corrugator for 
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negative words. The pattern holds both for action words of emotion or emotions states, being 
less clear in the case of the emotional states (adjectives). 
Words are not only able to elicit motor responses in the face but also are shown to be 
impacted by external motor simulations of emotion. Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) 
conducted a study in which they manipulated facial expression using Strack and colleagues’ 
(1988) procedures in order to covertly induce a smile or inhibit smile  facial expressions. 
They found that the facial pose had an impact in the understanding of language. Participants 
had to rate the pleasantness of valenced sentences. Reading times were the measure of text 
comprehension, and smiling subjects were faster reading positive sentences valence while 
inhibited participants were faster reading negative sentences. A second experiment produced 
the same results in a different variable: the perception of difficulty in understanding the 
sentences. In the area of language comphension but using an novel way of experimentally 
blocking mimicry through muscle paralyzing, Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli and 
Davidson (2009) studied people who voluntarily were subjected to botulinum toxin-A 
injections over the corrugator, with the cosmetic purpose to treat gabellar lines (frowning 
lines). As expected, individuals who were injected with botox, were faster in reading 
sentences of other emotions (happy and sad) than anger sentences processing information. 
This again strengthened the idea that peripheral feedback in language has a role in the 
processing of language.  
Another interesting study reports that even at the response level muscular 
compatibility between the response and the form of the response facilitates the performance. 
In Neumann and colleagues’ experiment (Neumann, Hess, Schulz, & Alpers, 2005), the 
response was not made on a computer keyboard but with the contraction of specific muscles 
(the zygomaticus and the corrugator). No reference was made to the muscles. Instead, they 
were instructed to “pull eyebrows together” in the case of corrugator, and to “raise the 
corners of your mouth”, for zygomaticus.  The authors found that contractions were faster 
when there was congruence between the valence of the facial pose and the valence of the 
word compared to the cases where incongruence occurred. 
It seems clear at this point that emotional words can stimulate emotion facial muscle 
activation. However and according to embodied view, whether the individual engages in 
deep simulation of the concept or makes a superficial analysis of it, may be dependent on the 
characteristics of task at hand (time, exposure, motivation or even the instruction driving 
selective attention for relevant features of the concept to be simulated). And the extent of 
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this simulation determines the quality of the response output. For example the detection of a 
congruence effect may be easier when the extent of simulation is wider (Niedenthal, 
Rohmann, & Dalle, 2003).  
Illustrating this idea Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, and Vermeullen (2009) 
asked participants to judge words according to two different criterions: indicating whether a 
word was emotional or not (conceptual task), or indicating if it was written in lower or upper 
case (perceptual task). In one case, the emotional processing was relevant for the task, on the 
other, was irrelevant. Only in the case of an emotional goal (indicating whether the word was 
emotional or not) was there evidence of recruitment of muscular activity (measured by EMG 
resonance in the check, eye, brow and nose region). Adding causal evidence to this 
interpretation, the authors ran a follow-up study, inviting participants to decide whether the 
words were associated to an emotion or not, this time, contrasting a group of individuals 
whose mimicry was free, and another whose mimicry was blocked through Niedenthal and 
colleagues’ (2001) procedure. The participants made more errors when judging the words 
when individuals were prevented to mimic than when their mimicry was free. However, this 
inhibitory effect of the pen manipulation was restricted to specific emotions. The authors 
hypothesised that holding a pen could only influence the activity in the lower part of the 
face, by decreasing the ability to raise the lip in smile, lower it in sadness, in contrast to the 
brow and other muscles in the upper face which should not suffer the impact of the 
manipulation. This could explain how, as sadness and happy concepts were impaired by the 
pen manipulation, but processing of anger or neutral was unaffected, suggesting that the 
blocking effects were limited to emotions that engage relevant muscles. 
  
In this chapter we have been focusing on emotion representation in order to answer 
to the question: “How is knowledge accessed when we perceived an emotion on others 
face?”  The evidence reviewed here suggests that not only concpetual knowledge is activated 
when we perceive emotions in others, our body may also react to it by simulating the usual 
bodily activity associated with that emotion. The muscles of our face may be one important 
aspect of that reaction. 
The literature reviewed suggests that somatosensory activation is present both when 
we perceive an emotional face or an emotional word.  The congruence of these activations 
may be a source of facilitation os processing one after the other. If this is so, we would argue 
that the presence of an emotional face can prime emotional processing through an embodied 
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mechanism.  In Chapter II we addressed this hypothesis reviewing the concept of priming 
and the evidence that can suggest as likely this hypothesis. 
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Chapter II: Somatosensory activation role in subsequent processing 
 
In Chapter I we provided evidence and theory to suggest that emotion representation 
involve somatosensory processes, particularly in face muscle activity. 
We postulated that this muscle activation occurs when the perception of an emotional 
face primes the emotion and impacts subsequent processing of congruent or incongruent 
emotional stimuli.  In order to understand this as a hypothesis that is worth being addressed, 
in the present chapter we defined priming as a general phenomenon that translates into a 
memory activation that interferes (in terms of latency and accuracy) with subsequent 
stimulus processing and focused on the impact of priming specific emotions (Carroll & 
Young, 2005; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1992; Matthews & Southall, 1991; Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997; Rossell & Nobre, 2004). These priming effects were 
explored here not only at the valence level but also at the emotional level. That is to say that 
an emotion was expected to affect, differently, the processing of related and unrelated 
emotional stimuli. This revision focused on anchors for our assumption that embodiment is a 
route for emotional priming. If the perception of emotions involves reactivation of the 
emotional experience, including its muscular correlates, then those may be involved in 
priming.  
 
Priming emotions 
Priming occurs when a presentation of a stimulus influences either positively or 
negatively the efficiency of subsequent processing of a related or unrelated stimulus. In 
some way, the temporary activation of the mental representation of those stimuli seems to 
affect subsequent perception, evaluation, motivation and even behaviour (e.g. Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). Such priming effects seem to be automatic in the sense that it is fast and 
short-lived (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997), 
depending neither upon explicit evaluative goals (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 
1996; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994), nor on the presence of deep processing 
resources (Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000). Furthermore, priming is not dependent on 
subject’s awareness, which means it can be observed if subliminal primes are presented (e.g. 
Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989; Greenwald, Klinger, & 
Schuh, 1995). 
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Methodologically, we refer to the context stimulus that is previously presented as a 
prime. Primes can have different natures and influence processing in different dimensions as 
for example, attitudes (e.g. Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), stereotypes (for 
an overview see Brauer, Wasel, & Niedenthal, 2000; Devine, 1989), and behaviours (e.g. 
Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Different stimuli features can act as primes in a specific 
context (such as its function, taxonomic category, affective colour, perceptive colour, status, 
gender, race).  When the stimuli feature is affect/valence, and it seems to impact subsequent 
affective reactions (e.g. evaluations) it has been referred as affective priming.  
 
Affective priming. Affective priming has been defined as an unintended influence of 
a first evaluative response to a stimulus (prime) on a subsequent target stimulus (see reviews 
Fazio, 2001; Klauer, 1998; for related results on influence paradigm Murphy, Monahan, & 
Zajonc, 1995; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel, de Groot, Geutskens, & Phaf, 2001).  
Fazio and collegues (1986) defined this phenomenon, demonstrating that presenting a word 
towards which an individual has an accessible attitude facilitates the processing of a 
subsequent one that is charged with a congruent affective valence. Fazio and colleagues 
presented to participants, as primes, negative and positive attitude objects (nouns) that were 
previously evalutated as having a strong versus a weak evaluative association (strongly 
good/ bad or weakly good/ bad). There was also a baseline condition, in which primes were 
neutral strings of letters (e.g. BBB). These primes were presented for 200 ms (SOA 300ms 
or 1000 ms) in task that involved saying whether other subsequent target words were good or 
bad, as fast as possible. Targets were 10 clearly positive and 10 clearly negative adjectives. 
Greater facilitation was observed on trials that had a relation of congruence between primes 
and targets than on trials involving incongruent valences for primes involving a strong 
evaluative association but not for primes involving a weak association. 
 The effect identified by Fazio and colleagues was highly replicable  (e.g. Bargh et 
al., 1996; Hermans et al., 1996; Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 1999). But affective priming 
can also be seen in the influence that the prime exerts on the valence of the judgment itself. 
Niedenthal (1990) offers us some examples of this. The author primed participants with 
happy, disgusted or neutral facial expressions for 2 seconds, having them to subsequently 
form an impression about a cartoon character. Participants who were exposed to the happy 
primes formed more positive impressions of the character than those who were primed with 
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disgust.  Also Murphy and Zajonc (1993) reported a similar finding. They used happy and 
angry facial expressions as primes, which were found to influence evaluations of neutral 
Chinese characters in an affect-congruent manner. When preceded by a happy prime, the 
neutral Chinese ideographs received higher ratings of likeability than when preceded by an 
angry one. And both types of primes were significantly different from the no prime and 
neutral control conditions.  
 
A categorical perspective: Emotional priming. Fazio’s approach focused on 
valence of the prime as the affective feature able to prime subsequent evaluations. Fazio’s 
view is thus an unidimensional model which attributes to valence (the level of positivity) of 
the emotional experience the greatest part of the variance encountered in the predicting 
valence congruent results. Other authors  (Osgood & Suci, 1955) pointed that such a valence 
model is limited because ultimately all information in memory carries some information 
about valence. For this reason, “an activated emotion unit would spread minimal activation 
to any given item to which was linked by valence” (e.g. Anderson & Bower, 1973; see also 
Isen, 1984). An emotion should be stronger prime to information that is highly associated 
with that emotion (e.g. Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; Halberstadt, 
Niedenthal, & Kushner, 1995; Hansen & Shantz, 1995; Laird, Wagener, Halal, & Szegda, 
1982). 
Some evidence suggests this to be the case. That is, specific emotions have been 
shown to influence subsequent processing of emotional stimuli (Niedenthal et al., 1997, 
1999). In an attempt to test specific priming with emotions, Niedenthal, and colleagues 
(1994) induced participants to feel happy or sad, by exposing them to music (allegros vs. 
adagios, respectively). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to perform a lexical 
decision task where they had to verify whether a string of letters was a word or not. In the 
pool of stimuli, they included positive words, (e.g. charm, insight, grace), words directly 
associated to happiness (e.g. joy, cheer, delight), negative words (e.g. blame, decay, crime) 
and words closely associated to sadness (e.g. hurt, despair, regret). Happy participants were 
more efficient (faster) in processing happy words than sad words, while there was a decrease 
in reaction times for sad participants when processing sad words relative to happy words. An 
additional exploration in terms of valence did not reveal significant differences. These 
results are suggestive of categorical congruence in perception. Additional analysis provided 
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evidence that the categorical account fit more elegantly for sad words than for happy. This is 
because sad subjects made lexical decisions about sad words faster than happy subjects, but 
not for negative words. On the other hand, happy subjects were no faster in processing happy 
words than positive words compared to sad participants. In Experiment 3, participants 
performed gender discriminations over happy and sad photos of males and females, after 
being induced to feel happy or sad. The results revealed that happy facial expressions were 
better discriminated in terms of gender when happy subjects performed the task compared to 
sad ones. The reverse was true for sad words. Although this does not provide evidence 
contrasting a categorical model to a valence model, it already provided support for emotion 
congruence in perception.  
Other studies brought more clarity to the claim of an emotion priming effect. One of 
such studies was carried by Niedenthal and collaborators (1997) who tried to reveal in a 
more powerful way this specific effect by contrasting different emotions that shared or did 
not share the same affective charge. They did this by first inducing participants to be happy, 
sad or neutral through the same procedure described above. After the induction participants 
completed a lexical decision task in which word stimuli were related to the following 
emotions: happiness, love, sadness and anger. The emotional state of the perceiver produced 
facilitation in the recognition of words that matched in emotional meaning. That is to say, 
happy participants were faster in recognizing happy words compared to neutral sad words. 
And conversely sad individuals were faster in recognizing sad words than happy words and 
controls. No facilitation effect was observed for love or anger words. The study clearly 
supports categorical priming (emotion priming). The same effect was achieved in a third 
experiment where instead of a performing a lexical decision, the participants pronounced a 
word as soon as it become visible on the screen. 
This same categorical effect of emotion has also been observed in studies in which 
specific emotions are primed with words, demonstrating that the effect is not only limited to 
the inducing of a particular emotional state in the subject as in the previous case, but can 
occur when subjects are primed with emotional words. Rossell and Nobre (2004) illustrated 
this idea, calling attention to the fact that the impact of priming specific emotions can differ 
across emotion category. In happy prime–target pairs the authors demonstrated the existence 
of priming effects, similar to the effect found for neutral pairs. This corroborates a previous 
study of Matthews and Southall (1991) who besides this, demonstrated that negative emotion 
word pairs produced the same pattern of facilitation. Rossell and Nobre (2004), on their side, 
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observed that in fearful pairs there was an absence of a priming effect or slight priming 
facilitation. Sad pairs displayed an inhibition effect that slowed responses to sad word 
targets.  The authors speculated that this is due to a compensatory mechanism that leads to 
the inhibition in the spread of sad affect. Alternatively, the spread of sad affect may have 
reduced the capacities of the word-processing system, requiring additional effort to process 
the targets, suggesting the operation of a controlled process. The authors proposed that this 
asymmetry verified in negative categories is due to an increased vigilance necessary in 
adverse contexts (controlled processing), or it may reflect that the associative mechanisms 
that links words of negative valence has a different nature. According to Rossell and Nobre 
(2004), the incongruent results on the patterns of priming using emotional categories, shown 
by different studies reflects a reality that emotional relatedness can be a less powerful form 
of semantic relatedness. 
The authors (Rossell and Nobre, 2004) also suggested that the focus on deeper levels 
of semantic or affective analysis of words, such as the affective judgment task and may yield 
different results, more approximate to the facilitation patterns encountered for happy pairs 
(De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans et al., 1994). This idea 
was empirically confirmed in the experiment by Carroll and Young (2005) in which 
participants were primed supraliminarly with facial expressions displaying, anger, happiness, 
sadness, fear, disgust and also a neutral facial display. Immediately after the exposure, 
participants were confronted with words belonging to the above emotion categories, which 
they verbally categorized in terms of the emotion with which it was related, in a force choice 
task. The authors observed that when prime (facial expression) and target (word) where 
strictly related in terms of the emotion they expressed, the reaction times were faster 
compared to the condition in which words were preceeded by neutral faces or to incongruent 
faces. Although there was a facilitation of the congruent responses over the responses of the 
neutral condition, no inhibition of incongruent pairs was observed. That is to say, 
incongruent trials did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. This finding 
suggests that categorical emotional priming is not a simple variant of semantic category 
priming, because it does not follow a typical semantic priming pattern of inhibition of the 
incongruent trials.  
 In the next section we discuss how priming effects have been framed and how 
embodiment can be a plausible alternative in their expalanation, specifically in the case of 
emotional category based priming effects. 
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Mechanisms accounting for priming effects 
Several mechanisms have been proposed to account for priming effects. Most of  the 
explanations account for the findings of a single experimental task, but fail to account for 
priming observed in other tasks. All accounts fail to explain why muscular feedback would 
interfere in priming effects (Foroni & Semin, 2009). 
The most popular explanations of the mechanisms assumed to underlie affective/ 
emotional priming effect is the mechanism of spreading activation similar to the one that 
explains semantic priming (Neely, 1991). A compound cue mechanism (Dosher & Rosedale, 
1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988) is also offered as an explanation of semantic priming 
effects and at the same time is able to account for affective priming. Differing form those 
two hypothesis because turns the effect independent of memory representations, the 
response competition mechanism (Klauer, 1998; Klauer et al., 1997), which makes an 
analogy of affective priming tasks with the Stroop paradigm (MacLeod, 1991). Finally we 
describe the affective-matching hypothesis developed by Klauer (1998; Klauer & Stern, 
1992), which views this priming as a result of responses bias.  
 
Spread of Activation Account. When one is perceiving the prime it is activated its 
corresponding node in a semantic network (Bower, 1981; Fazio et. al, 1986), and this 
activation then spreads to other nodes of evaluatively related targets, but not to inconsistent 
targets, this way facilitating processing of the target when there is a congruence between 
prime and target.  
Although this mechanism seems to be very straight forward in explaining the 
affective priming effects, there are many findings that are difficult to reconcile with it. 
This view does not predict context dependency effects, and facilitation of prime-
target congruent trials processing is expected, meaning that it is a context-independent 
effect, that occurs no matter the processing goal or task required. However there is a 
literature demonstrating that affective priming is task-dependent (e.g. De Houwer, Hermans, 
Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). 
Several studies have challenge the idea that affective priming holds for tasks that do not 
require an explicit evaluation of the target, as for example the naming task, where 
participants have to pronounce words as soon as they are displayed (Klauer & Musch, 2003). 
In a relevant study, De Houwer, and collaborators (2002; Exp. 2) compared a group of 
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participants that had to categorize targets as persons versus animals (semantic classification) 
to a group in which the participants were told to make evaluative decisions on these same 
targets. An affective priming congruence pattern only emerged for the evaluative decision 
task, contrary to the semantic-classification task condition where no affective priming effects 
were significant (e.g., for similar results Klinger et al., 2000; Wentura & Rothermund, 
2003). 
This task dependence should be difficult to explain for those who propose a 
spreading activation mechanism as explanation, once it defeats one of its assumptions 
(Fazio, 2001; Ferguson & Bargh, 2003; Klauer & Musch, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2003; 
Wentura & Rothermund, 2003). The automatic spread of activation that occurs during 
priming is, as its name suggests, automatic. These models do not consider a priori that task 
type influences the automatic spread of activation, they rather establish that efficiency in 
priming is defined by strength of association.  
Spread of activation also does not do a good job of explaining findings related to 
tasks in which affirmative and negative responses are required. In those cases the results 
indicate less pronounced effects as well as a tendency to verify reversed effects when 
negative responses are requested (Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klauer & Stern, 1992; Wentura, 
2000). 
Similarly, a spreading activation model has trouble accouting for list-context effects 
such as sequential effects found by Wentura (1999) and Greenwald and his team 
(Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996). This gap in accounting contextual effects is fulfilled 
by more recent theories as those described above. 
 
Compound Cue Theory. Ratcliff and McKoon (1988) and Dosher and Rosedale 
(1989) proposed that information is retrieved in memory through a process that combine 
various cues present in the context into a compound cue. 
 Instead of considering temporary associations in long term memory, as in a spreading 
activation account, compound cue models presuppose that prime and target are processed as 
a composite cue in the short term memory. When a comparison process, between composites 
and long term memory associations is triggered, a level of familiarity is experienced by the 
individual. And it is this level of familiarity of the composite prime-target resulting from this 
matching that determines the facilitation of congruent primes-target pairs both in terms of 
accuracy and response latency.  
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 McKoon and Ratcliff (1992), and Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, and Langer (1984) 
observed priming effects for pairs lexical stimuli which were not associated in terms of free-
association production measures. Even in cases in which free association does produce 
connections between words, “the production probabilities do not correctly predict priming 
effects” (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1994). For this reason, these authors believe free association 
as it is conceived by spreading activation, it is not a “veridical measure of distance in 
memory, and thus priming effects should be explained using other measures such as co-
occurrence statistics” (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). 
The fact that this approach takes into account the context and relies on short term 
memory associations makes it a powerful approach to explain order effects (Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 1994).  For example, a nonword preceeding a target should slow the responses to 
this target, as well as a prime related to a target should have an impact even if there is 
another item in between. 
   Critics of compound-cue theories highlight its failure to explain results from tasks 
such that do not deal with recognition memory such as the naming task and lexical decision 
task McNamara (1992).  According to Ratcliff and McKoon (1994) to produce semantic 
priming effects, it would be necessary to add a semantic component to the assumed priming 
effects. 
 As we can see this theory is a powerful explanation to affective priming effects if we 
assume that evaluation or emotional judgment tasks make use of recognition processes. If 
not, the model fails in understanding the phenomena.  As with the spreading of activation 
assumption this mechanism does not deal fully with the context effects found to be 
associated with affective priming, since cues should activate the same memory 
representation independent upon the goal with which this is done. 
 
Response Competition. Assuming independence of priming effects of simple 
memory representation, the response competition hypothesis views priming as a Stroop-like 
effect (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979), a mechanism also capable of explaining context effects. 
The Response Competition Model (e.g. Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al., 1996; Klauer et 
al., 1997; Wentura, 1999) puts the focus on the response instead of in memory 
representation. Prime and target develop simultaneously motor response tendencies on the 
keyboard. The response towards the prime can be compatible or incompatible with the 
response that is activated by the target. However, this tendency to respond to the prime is 
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irrelevant, because the task requires the individual just to respond the target. The latency to 
respond to the target is the time to eliminate this irrelevant tendency to respond to the prime. 
When prime and target are congruent there’s no need to eliminate this tendency, so the 
response to the target is faster than in the case of incongruency.  
The model hypothesizes the existence of two response thresholds when a response is 
delivered. First, there is an automatic component of the prime weight which is positive. This 
is no more than an automatic influence of irrelevant prime evaluations. Besides this, the 
prime weight has a strategic component related to attention allocation, requiring conscious 
processing, occurring when the prime information is generally useful (Cheesman & Merikle, 
1986). A response is given as soon as the gathered evidence falls outside the interval defined 
by the two thresholds. The available evidence is given by a weighted sum of the 
accumulated prime information and the accumulated target information.  
Because this Stroop-like mechanism integrates the impact of irrelevant information, 
is specially successful explaining visible and masked affective priming in evaluative 
decisions (MacLeod, 1991), consistency proportion effects and sequential effects 
(Greenwald et al., 1996). Negative priming effects as demonstrated by Wentura (1999) for 
affective priming are generally found in Stroop-like tasks, as well as effects of prime 
strength (Musch, 2000) where prime and target evaluations are integrated in the form of a 
weighted sum. This mechanism also explains the absence of affective priming in tasks that 
require nonevaluative responses to target stimuli. This weighting mechanism allows that 
only response-relevant prime information is integrated. This strength ends up being also a 
limitation. This model cannot explain priming in nonevaluative tasks that require both 
affirmative and negative responses such as the lexical decision task. It also fails to explain 
the complex results in the pronunciation task. Summarizing, the Stroop mechanism well 
integrates the task dependency issue, but isn’t able to explain why in some nonevaluative 
tasks there’s still priming effects. 
 
The Affective-Matching Mechanism. The affective-matching mechanism is a 
postlexical mechanism and was originally proposed to explain evaluative consistency in 
social judgments (e.g. Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Cooper, 1981; Klauer & Stern, 1992; 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The model has three basic assumptions: a) evaluations of both 
prime and target are activated automatically and compared in terms of evaluative 
consistency independently of the individual’s processing goal/task; b) evaluative consistency 
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of the prime-target pairs creates a feeling of plausibility and evaluative inconsistency 
produces a feeling of implausibility; c) the feeling of plausibility facilitates the delivery of 
affirmative responses, while the feeling of implausibility inhibits them. On the other hand, a 
feeling of implausibility facilitates the emergence of negative responses, whereas a feeling of 
plausibility inhibits such responses.  
 The advantage of this mechanism lies in the fact that it can explain priming effects 
whenever affirmative or negative responses are required by the task at hand (e.g. lexical 
decisions), integrating both congruent and incongruent pairs, as the case of lexical decision 
task. In this case, an affective priming effect is predicted for word targets although the 
evaluations of prime and target are irrelevant (contrary with what would be predicted by the 
response competition mechanism). In summary, the explanation power of the affective-
matching model overcomes processing goal effects, and accounts for affective priming in 
wide contexts, integrating effects in non-evaluative tasks and negative response patterns, at 
least in binary response tasks. 
 
Priming in an embodied perspective. Embodied cognition offers a suitable 
famework for explaining priming that although anchored in concept representation, goes far 
away from the assumptions made by the two models described above. In addition, the 
framework accounts for evidence that the four previously-described cannot elegantly 
explain.  Studies such as the ones (referred to in Chapter I) were developed by Foroni and 
Semin, (2009, 2011) and reveal that disrupting facial mimicry eliminates priming effect of 
valenced words on ratings of an evaluative judgment. These authors primed positive and 
negative words, and showed that the primes had a congruence effect on the funniness ratings 
of a cartoon. When the participants performed the task when their facial mimicry had been 
blocked , no differences were detected in the funniness ratings of positively primed and 
negatively primed individuals. 
In addition, findings revealing that pre-motor cortex is involved when facial 
expressions are primed suggest that embodied cognition may be a relevant approach in 
explaining the priming phenomenon. Hsu, Hetrick, & Pessoa (2008) primed participants 
with facial expressions of anger, happiness and neutral in high (90ms) and low (33ms) 
visibility conditions over target words pertaining to happy and fear categories. Then, 
subjects were asked to press a button to indicate whether the word was happy or fearful. 
Results suggested a priming effect, in that reaction times in response to the targets were 
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faster when congruent trials were presented compared to incongruents, in high visibility 
conditions, contrary to low visibility, where no difference was found. Important to our claim 
that embodied simulation is in charge in priming effects, was that lateralized readiness 
potentials (LRP’s) were measured over the motor cortex. The analysis of these 
electrophysiological results provides data on the initiation of a preparation process on motor 
cortex towards the stimuli. The authors were able to detect, in high visibility, but not in low 
visibility conditions a difference between congruent and incongruent trials, respecting the 
values of LRP’s. This is considered a marker of an initiation process on the motor cortex. 1 
Studies such as the ones described above provide initial evidence that amodal 
theories do not have enough power to account for priming phenomena, and that embodiment 
theories can be a suitable explanation. One of the criticisms of spreading activation models is 
their inability to explain task dependency effects. As well as the other models, this is a 
limitation that embodied theories of cognition are prepared to overcome. In an experiment 
demonstrating that embodiment is not a simple case of spread of activation, of memory 
features together with other physiological features, and embodiment effects rely on 
processing goals, Niedenthal and colleagues (2009) asked participants to respond whether 
presented words were written in upper or lower case. If that was the case, an automatic 
spread of activation from the concept to the facial expression facial expression of the 
participant that was being measured should have occurred. However, no specific activation 
of the muscles occurred even though the exposure time to the words was relatively long, 
sufficient for somatic responses to be primed automatically (Stroop, 1935). The activation of 
facial muscles only occurred when the task requested the activation of relevant simulations, 
that is emotional task that involved deciding whether the word was emotional or not. In fact 
“the more priming is shown to be dependent of the task requirements, stimuli and other 
procedural factors, the more likely that the effect is not caused by the production of an 
automatic affective response” (Niedenthal et al., 2003). This evidence of task dependence 
raises the possibility that, although affective priming can occur across dimensions of stimuli, 
it may be that the process also anchors in more specific features of stimuli representation. 
Thus, across generality of priming effects, bodily correlates can also have a role in priming 
                                                 
1 We should be alert to the idea that, high that supraliminal exposure should be more prone in 
revealing behavioural responses as well as neural responses which is completely in line with the embodied 
perspective that states that exposure time is able to influence the extent of simulation. 
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effects. These theories are able to fully account for task dependency, suggesting that 
affective responses only are triggered when evaluative tasks are requested because the 
embodied simulation is partial. In other words, the evaluative task mobilizes attention to 
relevant features of the stimuli in the current situation (Barsalou, 1999), in this case, the 
affective ones.  
Althought other models can support task dependency effects, those same accounts 
weren’t shaped to make precise a priori predictions about what type of embodied simulation 
should support what type of task. It should be remembered that none of the four non-
embodied alternatives can account for the absence of affective priming effects when 
mimicry is impaired in a priming task (Foroni & Semin, 2009, 2011). Similarly to 
Niedenthal and colleagues (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2004)  we also assume that 
embodiment can provide a parsimonious explanation for congruency effects in affective/ 
emotion category priming.  
In addition to this, according to Niedenthal and colleagues (Niedenthal et al., 2004), 
in embodied cognition the target affectively congruent word completes a simulation pattern 
already triggered by the prime. Priming makes a concept more accessible because it 
potentiates its simulation. A higher accessibility is expected with representation of a more 
perceptual grounding of the concept. Thus, even if at a conceptual level semantic priming 
occurs, embodiment may have a relevant role in enhancing the probability of re-enacting 
affective properties of the concept. The extent of simulation of a concept is a determinant of 
the impact of that concept on subsequent processing and behavioural responses. If we 
enhance simulation by priming it, a greater priming effect will emerge (NIedenthal et al., 
2003). 
As we can see from above, spread of activation isn’t able to account for contextual 
effects, something that all the remaining models are able to do. However, copound cue 
models cannot manage to explain outside the spectrum of tasks that do not rely on memory, 
as well as response competition models cannot explain priming effects in binary response 
tasks as lexical decision tasks. In turn none of those models are able to integrate a priori, 
bodily effects. 
As a conclusion, it should be mentioned that these explanations are accounted for 
mechanisms that are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Fazio, 2001; Klauer, 1998). All of 
them may contribute to affective priming in different conditions and shifts in the mechanism 
can occur as a function of the task that is performed. And especially when emotional 
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information is involved, and simulation of emotional components is triggered, embodied 
priming mechanism should be the more adapted response to task requirements.  
 
Summarizing… 
Priming occurs in an affective dimension. Although the valence can be the relevant 
dimension in the influence of the processing of one stimulus on another, several studies 
suggest that the category of the affect is also relevant. This categorical approach is here 
named emotion category based priming, and assumes that priming a particular emotion 
facilitates the response to a target of the same emotion more than any other emotion. 
From several explanations that literature offers for the priming phenomenon, 
embodiment perspective presents us one of the best to fit emotional priming since its able to 
naturally predict emotional specificity as well as giving a satisfactory explanation for the 
long lasting debate on the task dependency of priming effects. Assuming emotions are 
represented by their physiological correlates and simulation of these correlates when an 
emotion is perceived, it is expected that these embodiment features exert a role on emotion 
priming effects. This is because facilitation in priming occurs as a consequence of congruent 
targets completing a simulation pattern already triggered by the prime. Thus, disturbing 
simulation would at least have a detrimental effect in priming, showing this way that 
mimicry has an impact on it. 
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Chapter III: Facial muscles’ activity as embodiment of emotion constructs. 
Some methodological issues 
 
In order to understand the facial muscles’ role in emotional priming effects, as 
assumed by an embodied perspective, several methodological issues must be addressed. In 
this chapter we discuss: a) how face musculature maps onto to different emotions; b)  how 
can we measure muscle activity, c) how to prevent face musculature from being activated by 
an emotion, and d) how to adapt the priming paradigm to this measurement. 
 
Human facial muscles and emotion 
 Human facial expression has been widely recognized as a powerful means of 
communicating emotions and allowing the observer to ascribe mental states to the others. 
Many researchers accept the idea that basic emotions are expressed as both distinct facial 
expressions (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1994) and different autonomic patterns  (Levenson, 
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). In this section we summarize our knowledge about which muscles 
are involved in the expression of each emotion (happiness, anger and sadness), and the 
physical characteristics of those muscles as well as the activities they perform, and the 
association of those actions to particular emotions. 
 Happiness is known to produce changes in various parts of the face recruiting more 
muscle activity over all the face compared to other type of emotions. Evidence for this is 
found in one experiment conducted by Oberman and colleagues (2007) that measured the 
activity of several muscles (i.e. zygomaticus major, levator, orbicularis oris, and 
buccinator). When participants smiled, researchers observed higher levels of activity than 
when the participants expressed any other emotion. However, in a very consistent way, 
across studies, the zygomaticus has been demonstrated to be the muscle responsible for 
happy facial displays (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman, Friesen, & Tomkins, 1971; Hjortsjö, 
1970; Izard, 1971). This muscle (see Gray, 1918/2000) the “zygomaticus (zygomaticus 
major), is a muscle that arises from the zygomatic bone, in front of the zygomaticotemporal 
suture, and descending obliquely with a medial inclination, is inserted into the angle of the 
mouth, where it blends with the fibers of the caninus, orbicularis oris, and triangularis”. It’s 
action involves pushing lip corners up and back  (Fridlund, 1994; Hjortsjö, 1970).  
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Figure1. Facial Muscles, image from (Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2007). 
 
There is also consistent report of the activity of another muscle, the corrugator, as 
responsible for the creation of the frown as in anger (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman et al., 
1971; Hjortsjö, 1970; Izard, 1971). Anatomically (Gray, 1918/2000)  the corrugator 
supercilii is a “small, narrow, pyramidal muscle, placed at the medial end of the eyebrow, 
beneath the frontalis and orbicularis oculi. It arises from the medial end of the superciliary 
arch; and its fibers pass upward and lateralward, between the palpebral and orbital portions 
of the orbicularis occuli, and are inserted into the deep surface of the skin, above the middle 
of the orbital arch”. The action of corrugator is drawing the eyebrows together and 
downward, producing vertical furrows between brows, forming a frown (Ekman & Friesen, 
1978; Ekman et al., 1971; Hjortsjö, 1970). 
Sadness is an emotion that seems to show most clearly in the eye area (Ekman et al., 
1971). However, several muscles are contracted in the face of individuals feeling sadness. 
Orbicularis oris, among other muscles (corrugator, frontalis, elevators, orbicularis oculi, 
pyramidal) is involved in the expression of sadness (Waynbaum, 1907). The activity of 
orbicularis oris is, according to Perotto (2005), also associated with more extreme 
expressions of sadness such as grief and despair. But notice it is also involved in the 
expression of anger (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988). 
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Anatomically (Gray, 1918/2000) the orbicularis oris “consists of numerous strata of 
muscular fibers surrounding the orifice of the mouth but having different direction. It 
consists partly of fibers derived from the other facial muscles which are inserted into the 
lips, and partly of fibers proper to the lips. Of the former, a considerable number are derived 
from the buccinator and form the deeper stratum of the orbicularis”. The orbicularis oris 
allows the inversion of lips, tightening, pouting, compressing, protruding; (Daniels & 
Worthingham, 1986; Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman et al., 1971; Gray, 1918/2000; 
Hjortsjö, 1970; Izard, 1971; Kendall & McCreary, 1980; Weaver, 1977) . 
Although there is wide consensus about the interpretation of the zygomaticus as a 
positive reaction to a stimuli and the activity of the corrugator, as a negative reaction, there 
is less consensus about the interpretation of orbicularis oris. Bush and Tassinary (1992) 
point out that in experiments that used mildly pleasant or unpleasant eliciting stimuli, 
orbicularis oris failed to differentiate between them (compaire Bush, Barr, McHugo, & 
Lanzetta, 1989; Cacioppo, Petty, & Marshall-Goodell, 1984; Dimberg 1986, 1988; Englis, 
Vaughan, & Lanzetta, 1982; Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989), suggesting that this muscle is 
not as responsive as zygomaticus and corrugator. Even though, considering other muscles in 
the perioral area, this one is known to be the most reactive one. Tassinary, Cacioppo, Geen 
& Vanman (1987) ran an experiment in which they recorded the activity of the following 
perioral muscles mentalis, orbicularis oris superior, orbicularis oris inferior, and depressor 
anguli inferioris while asking the participants to adopt facial actions described by FACS 
involving perioral movements. Only the site over the orbicularis oris inferior muscle region 
displayed higher activation when the individuals posed, compared to the referred proximal 
muscles, suggesting this muscle to be the most reactive eletromyographically in that specific 
area. 
As we can see in the schema depicting the facial muscles, these muscles are richly 
interconnected. And, although there are muscles most associated with a certain emotion, a 
component of general muscle activity is also present in most emotions, as Oberman and 
colleagues (2007) suggest. As specific effects of muscles arise, also general effects of 
muscular activity, may be expected. 
Another point of interest concerning the characteristics of muscles is their contraction 
times. This is especially relevant when we are dealing with tasks that involve short-lived 
effects (such as priming), where we have to be precise in choosing the time window of the 
muscle activity measurement. All facial muscles exhibit fast contraction times (Linquist, 
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1973). Haggard and Isaacs (1966) verified that is possible to observe muscular changes as 
early as 125-200ms. Although the reaction itself may start within that range, the time where 
the muscle activation is able to show discriminative responses to different kinds of stimuli is 
slightly higher. In a series of experiments employing the same paradigm, in which 
participants were passively exposed to photos of facial expressions of happy and angry facial 
expressions, (Dimberg, 1991, 1994, 1997b) the zygomaticus, as expected, revealed increased 
activity towards happy stimuli compared to angry faces. And the reverse was true for 
corrugator. This differentiation between the two types of stimuli occurred for both muscles, 
consistently across studies, around 300 ms for corrugator and 400 ms for zygomaticus. 
Responsiveness of the muscles is also a feature of muscles that could enhance the 
difficulty of observing the activity of certain muscles using statistical techniques. Not only is 
the corrugator quicker in its onset, but the literature also suggests a superiority of corrugator 
over zygomaticus in terms of responsiveness. In an experiment Lang and colleagues (Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993) used pictures that varied across a dimension of 
pleasantness and unpleasantness. Each stimulus was viewed for a 6-sec period while 
zygomaticus and corrugator activity were measured. There was a stronger linear effect of 
valence on activity of corrugator than of the zygomaticus. This was interpreted as a certain 
insensitiveness of the zygomaticus to substantial portions of the valence dimension, which 
defined a quadratic component in the relationship. The magnitude of the quadratic 
relationship between valence and activity over zygomaticus was stronger, and so, the 
increasing or decreasing of values of valence produced nonmonotonic changes in the 
zygomaticus. These results were replicated by Larsen and colleagues (2003). Their 
participants were instructed to pay attention to three groups of stimuli: pictures, words, and 
sounds. The group of stimuli appeared in a random order. While pictures and words were 
projected, sounds were delivered by speakers. The stimuli were presented for a 6 second 
period. Following the recovery period, participants rated their positive and negative reactions 
to each stimulus separately, on two dimensional instead of an unidimensional scale of 
valence. Valence had a visibly stronger effect on activity over corrugator supercilii and this 
was true for all three tasks. In a similar fashion it was found an equally strong quadratic 
effect of the zygomaticus.  
In general, the literature suggests some consensus around the idea  that zygomaticus 
major, the orbicularis oris, and the corrugator supercilii are involved in the expressions of 
happiness, sadness, and anger respectively. Morever, it suggests that although muscle 
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contraction is very quick. It is more or less after 400ms after the presentation of an emotional 
stimulus that the activation of the muscle (which is related to the emotion of the stimulus) 
assumes a significant more active pattern than other muscles.  
 
Measurement of muscle activity. Measurement of muscle activity has to have 
uniform criteria across studies so that they can be comparable. The most popular guidelines, 
widely used for EMG measurement are those of Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). 
In EMG studies surface electromyography rather than needle or fine-wire electrodes 
are typically used (Tassinary & Cacioppo, 2000). Although electrodes are less sensitive 
measuring muscular sites more than specific single motor units (Lawrence & De Luca, 1983; 
Lippold, 1967) they are less invasive. For this purpose, silver – silver chloride electrodes are 
used in surface EMG, which chemical stability makes it less sensitive to artifacts, and thus, 
less susceptible to noise (Cooper, Osselton, & Shaw, 1980). 
Electrodes are usually attached with double-sided adhesive tape and filled with a 
highly conductive substance to stabilize the interface between skin and the electrode. This 
reduces movement artifacts because gel establishes an elastic connection between the two 
surfaces (Tassinary & Cacioppo, 2000), which will reduce interelectrode impedance.  Site 
preparation should involve the rubbing of skin surface with alcohol, in order to clean it from 
dirt and oily substances. 
The most typical method of electrode attachment to the skin is the bipolar 
configuration, which involves affixed electrode pairs parallel to the course of muscle fibers, 
which was shown to produce sensitive and selective recording of activity (Basmajian & De 
Luca, 1985; Cooper et al., 1980). This is because the bipolar configuration is more sensitive 
to fluctuations in the electrical activity within the pairs of electrodes than between other 
pairs of electrodes (cross-talk). Electrodes should be placed proximal and orientated parallel 
to the muscle (this is to say, parallel to voltage gradients) and distal and perpendicular to 
extraneous signal sources (other muscles). 
O’Dweyr et al. (1981) argued that is not possible to specify standard sites using 
landmarks unless with palpation of the muscle specifically for each subject, due to a great 
variability between individuals. However according to other authors, it should be possible to 
identify sites (e.g. Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). Establishing guidelines for the electrode 
placement should take into account factors just as proximity to the muscle (with minimal 
interference of other muscles); position of the electrode in reference to the direction of 
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muscle fiber; locations of ease attachment (avoiding skin folds for example); choosing 
anatomical landmarks that show uniformity across participants. 
Tassinary and colleagues (Tassinary et al., 1987,1989) report relevant data for the 
isolation of the corrugator and zygomaticus major muscle regions and for the position of 
electrodes for muscles in the perioral area.  In an experiment (Tassinary et al., 1989) subjects 
were instructed to pose different facial actions so that they activated certain muscles. Facial 
action was coded according to Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978) and 
EMG activity was measured in series of different sessions so that could be elaborated a 
measure of reliability. The authors recorded activity over zygomaticus major and corrugator 
supercilii and adjacent muscle sites (depressor supercilii/procerus, zygomaticus minor, 
risorius/ buccinator) so that the specificity of the measurement could be assessed. The 
chosen sites were selected on the basis of anatomical studies (Duchenne, 1867/1959; 
Kennedy & Abbs, 1979; Lightholder, 1925; Martone & Edwards, 1962; Weaver, 1977).  
For corrugator, the first electrode is placed “directly above the endocanthion just 
superior to the eyebrow; the second electrode placed lateral from the first along an imaginary 
line extending from the gabella to the ipsilateral superciliary arch of the frontal bone. This 
line forms a 60º angle (SD=11º) with the facial midline”. For the zygomaticus major, the 
“first electrode is placed 2.5cm from the cheilion (i.e. the lip corner at rest) along an 
imaginary line connecting the cheilion to the ipsilateral  condylion (palpable when the jaw is 
moved) and the second electrode was placed posterior and lateral to the frst along this 
imaginary line. This second electrode was also the first electrode for the upper channel, and 
the second electrode for this upper channel is placed further back continuing along this 
imaginary line”. The authors verified the present configuration of electrodes exhibited 
greater activity for facial actions that were associated by authors as Ekman and Friesen 
(1978) to corrugator as for example knitting brows, than the remaining poses. The same was 
true for the configuration of zygomaticus comparing facial actions of tightening the cheeks 
and drawing lips down, for example. In a second experiment the authors compared different 
sites along the extension of the zygomaticus, in order to identify the most discriminating one. 
The most effective sites for measuring are situated in a small region in the infraorbital 
triangle between 2.5 and 4.5 cm back from the corner of the mouth along an imaginary line 
extending between the cheilion and the preauricular depression. In sum, the optimal 
placement for electrodes over the zygomaticus major was between cheilion and the midpoint 
of an imaginary line extending from the cheilion and the preauricular depression.  
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For corrugator, although the optimal place was not tested systematically along its 
extension, the recording over the site, superior and lateral to the endocanthion along the 
brow line, proven to give sufficiently discriminatory results in the first experiment. 
According to Fridlund and Cacioppo’s (1986) guidelines, the orbicularis oris leads 
should be placed in the following configuration: “the first electrode is affixed 1cm bellow 
the cheilion, and second electrode is placed 1cm medial to, and slightly inferior to, the first, 
so that the electrode pair runs parallel to the lower lip border.  
The ground electrode should be used in the mid-forehead (approximately 3-4cm) 
superior to the upper borders of the inner brows, near the hairline. 
  
 
Figure 2. Tassinary and Cacioppo (2007) Suggested electrode placements for surface EMG recording of the 
facial muscles, based on Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). (Modified and redrawn from Figure 6 of Cacioppo et 
al., 1990). 
 
Having already defined the muscles involved in the expressions of happiness, sadness 
and anger, it is also important to assess the literature that shows those muscles can be 
manipulated, and if the already existing manipulations are able to impact those muscles in 
the same way or not. For this reason, we next focus our attention in the procedural and 
electromyographic characteristics of manipulations of facial expressions. Specially we 
discuss those that were shaped to impair muscle’s activity and thus able to show the impact 
of the absence of this activity in other dimensions as behavioural measures. 
 
Manipulations of facial activity: expression and blocking. The literature proposes 
various ways of manipulating muscle activity either by exaggerating/suppressing facial 
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expressions, by offering muscle by muscle instruction, and by using other more subtle 
manipulations such as the pen-in-the-mouth manipulation.  
Exaggeration and dissimulation paradigms involve exaggerating/suppressing facial 
expressions that should occur in response to a wide range of emotional stimuli as for 
instance, electric shocks or pleasant/unpleasant videos (Colby, Lanzetta, & Kleck, 1977; 
Kleck et al., 1976; Kraut, 1982; Lanzetta et al., 1976; McCanne & Anderson, 1987; 
Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance, & Spiegel, 1981). For instance, Zuckerman and colleagues 
(1981) requested participants not to reveal their reaction to videos. Although these 
procedures have shown that voluntary facial efference/dissimulation has an impact on 
emotional experience and autonomic patterns (for a review see Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; 
Laird, 1984; Manstead & Wagner, 1988; Matsumoto, 1987; McIntosh, 1996; Winton, 1986), 
Strack and colleagues (Strack et al., 1988) warned that these kind of procedures do not 
eliminate ambiguities and experimental artefacts. These authors interpreted some past 
findings in terms of cognitive mediation and not due to physiological mechanisms. They 
argued that it may be the case that participants in past experiments have used cognitive 
strategies to support the required facial expression or directed away their attention from the 
emotional stimulus instead of the the results being the consequence of suppressing the facial 
expression that would occur in the sequence of the exposure.  
An alternative procedure that would eliminate the above problem, was facial posing 
introduced by (Laird, 1974) or muscle-by-muscle instructions with or without emotional 
stimuli (Duclos et al., 1989; Hess, Kappas, McHugo, & Lanzetta, 1992; Laird, 1974; 
Rutledge & Hupka, 1985; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979), in which participants were 
requested to exhibit a certain facial display. In the latter case, participants were requested to 
activate specific muscles involved in certain facial expressions never mentioning that they 
should modify their own expression. 
Refining the way in which the intents of the experiment are disguised, Strack and 
colleagues (1988) created a procedure that covertly induced facial expressions without 
directing attention to this objective or inducing participants to associate their facial response 
to a particular emotion. This procedure was associated with a cover story which said that the 
study concerned psychomotor coordination, and people’s ability to perform different motoric 
tasks with parts of their body not normally used for those tasks, as handicapped person have 
to do. A slight adaptation of the cover story was used by Havas and colleagues (2007). They 
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told participants the study concerned language processing and the manipulations were 
specifically designed to prevent the articulation of words. 
Consistent with the cover story of Strack and colleagues (1988), participants were 
told to perform various tasks with a pen, involving holding it in different positions. That 
would cause to activate certain muscles associated to specific facial expressions. The tasks 
were: holding a pen with the lips (with its tip out of the mouth), with the teeth or with their 
nondominant hand (being this the control condition). The lips instructions emphasized that 
subjects should not touch the pen with the teeth, and in this way inhibiting smile (or as it is 
referred in more recent literature, “impairing muscles associated with the smile”). The smile 
was facilitated for participants who held a pen with the teeth, preventing their lips from 
touching it. No difference regarding the difficulty of performing the task was observed 
(Strack et al., 1988) between conditions, thus eliminating alternative explanations of the 
results based on the difficulty. Also, Soussignan (2002) ruled out any difference of 
pleasantness of the two pen-holding techniques, which may have produced the differences in 
the dependent measure of interest (funniness of a cartoon). In addition to this, the authors 
manipulated the intensity of the manipulation by asking participants to prevent their lips 
from touching in different degrees, was shown not to have a differential impact on the 
dependent measure. 
 
Blocking: Inhibition of muscle activity. Although the pen-teeth task clearly induces 
zygomaticus activation, there is not clear understanding of the pen lip task. The pen lip task 
could be more an inhibition of smile manipulation than a promotion of any type of 
activation. However its status of “blocking of emotion” is put into question (Soussignan, 
2002). The manipulation seems to activate the orbicularis oris (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; 
Ekman et al., 1988). For this reason, this manipulation should not be thought to block, 
because it is in fact inducing a particular expression. 
However, blocking is a necessary strategy to study the role of a particular muscle. 
Understanding this, Niedenthal and colleagues study (2001) created a new manipulation 
inspired by Strack and colleague’s methodology (1988). This blocking procedure did not 
produce any facial configuration associated with any emotion in particular. The 
manipulation involved asking participants to hold a pen sideways in the mouth pressing 
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slightly with lips and teeth. This manipulation proved to be effective in interfering with the 
perception of facial expression (see Niedenthal et al. 2001, Experiment 2). 
We should, however, notice that the blocking is not general. That is, this procedure 
does not block all the face muscles. According to Niedenthal and colleagues (2001) this 
manipulation effectively prevents mimicry in the lower face. However in the upper face, 
mimicry can still occur, allowing some aspects of the perceived facial expressions to be 
mimicked. Still, the pen manipulation will not allow the same level of match between the 
perceived face and the perceiver’s muscular activity. This manipulation has been used in 
several studies (Foroni & Semin, 2009; Niedenthal et al., 2009; Stel & van Knippenberg, 
2008). 
 Stel and van Knipenberg (2008) offer an alternative blocking procedure, that is a 
slight modification of Nidenthal and colleagues’ (2001) manipulation. They asked 
participants to simply clench their teeth without any pen. Unfortunately, there are some 
disvantages of this technique. First, it is likely to cause the participant to allocate attention to 
his own facial expression. In addition, it may induce the embodiment of anger, because if an 
exaggerated pressure is exerted, clenching the teeth may be involved. Finally, it may be the 
case that the pressure exerted on the pen is not constant during the task because of fatigue 
caused by the effort and because the participant is engaged in a concurrent task.  
The advantage of using the pen is thus clear. In addition if participants are 
permanently holding something in the mouth that may fall, this would signal that the subject 
is not accomplishing the task correctly, allowing one to correct for it. 
  Unfortunately, blocking procedures are not clearly understood in how and in what 
muscle they activate. It is not clearly specified which muscles were involved when the 
participants were required to hold the pen in the mouth, and to what degree this happened, 
and how this involvement was related specifically to the impairment of the recognition of 
each emotions in particular. The advantage of being aware of what specific muscles are 
engaged when a muscular manipulation is performed is allowing the experimenter to 
formulate more specific hypothesis, of the effects of the manipulation on the responses to the 
emotion specific stimuli. 
Oberman and colleagues (2007) were the first to test the muscular involvement of a 
blocking procedure. They asked whether muscle activity was promoted by a blocking 
procedure, assuming that impairing simulation was not associated with specific muscle 
activity but is not also associated with an absence of activity. On the contrary, all muscles 
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should be activated, creating kind of an unspecific global activation that they would name as 
muscular noise. However this concept of noisy activation is still unclear in literature, leaving 
room to pose several hypothesis of what it may be. According to Glenberg and Colleagues 
(2008) a peripheral muscular blockade should generate increased muscular output but loss of 
specificity similarly to what happens in muscle fatigue (Gandevia, 2001).  
Other ways of interfering with muscle activity besides mechanical action as the pen 
procedure are also available. Botox paralyzes the muscle through mechanism that blocks the 
release of acetylcholine in the terminal bouton of the motor neuron (at the neuromuscular 
junction.) Nerve signals remain unaffected when travelling from the brain to the muscle but 
no acetylcholine is released at the muscle synapse. Thus, no feedback reaches the muscle 
and consequently no movement is performed (Dolly & Aoki, 2006). So, no information is 
sent back to the central nervous system, reducing this way the afferent feedback from the 
muscles to the brain (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). On the other hand, inducing an increase of 
skin resistance with a dermal filler (Restylane), does not impair muscle function, allowing 
facial feedback to occur (Brandt & Cazzaniga, 2007). Neal and Chartrand (2011) have gone 
even further showing this substance increases the effort the individual has to make in order 
to counteract the skin resistence, resulting in increased feedback when compared to 
participants who were injected with botox. They verified this result in a task that involved 
selecting the emotion that best matched a certain facial expression, among three different 
emotional labels. From these few examples we can conclude that each manipulation is a 
different case and involves completely different mechanisms. This highlights the need of a 
careful pretest whenever a blocking manipulation is required. 
Although chemical alternatives are the most selective and precise in the way of 
impairing muscles, such a methodology has the disvantage of being invasive and expensive. 
Certainly factors that still constrain its use. 
 
Methodological Adaptation of the priming procedure in an EMG study 
Priming effects are studied with a specific paradigm: a stimulus (the prime) 
presentation is followed by a target stimulus (the probe) to which subjects should react. In 
order to study the role of muscle activation in this process, muscle measurement has to be 
developed between the prime presentation and the target. As previously referred muscles 
have their own timing for developing their activity. So, exposure time of primes should be 
higher than 400 ms, in order to be sufficient for the development of EMG activity. However, 
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it should be noted that affective priming effects tend to be short lived in time, and so we 
should use short interstimulus intervals (<100ms), in order to obtain reliable affective 
priming effects (Hermans et al., 2001, 2003) replicating Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) in 
this respect. 
In the following section we used these features in defining our experimental approach 
to the question of what is the role of muscle activity in emotion priming effects.  
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Our empirical approach to the question of the role of an embodiment such as face 
muscle activity in emotional category priming was investigated in two studies: one that 
examined the emotional category priming effect and other that addressed blocking impact on 
that effect. Between these two experiments, we addressed the implications of Niedenthal and 
colleagues’ (2001) blocking procedure, to muscle activity, in order to understand its impact 
on emotional category priming effects. 
The studies relied on an experimental priming paradigm inspired by Carroll  and 
Young (2005). We expected to replicate emotion category priming effects with the 
emotional task used by (Niedenthal et al., 2009). Our targets were words that represented 
three categories of emotions (happy, sad, and angry) and words not related to any emotion. 
These words were preceded by related or unrelated emotional facial expressions, or were not 
primed at all. Participants were asked to categorize target words as emotional vs. non-
emotional. We expected to find evidence of emotional category priming across nonverbal 
(facial expressions) and verbal (words) stimuli, simply because they share emotional 
semantic features associated with face’s muscular activation. Therefore, and consistent with 
prior research (Carroll & Young, 2005), we expected the results of our two experiments to 
show that emotional specific category words could be primed by congruent facial expression 
(i.e., anger would prime anger more than sadness, even though they are both negative 
emotions). 
Because Hsu, Hetrick, and  Pessoa (2008) showed emotion priming effects to be 
dependent upon depth of processing of face expressions (high-visibility conditions) primes 
were presented for 500 ms (see Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008 for a contra-argument). 
Note that although the extent of facial expression processing without awareness remains a 
matter of debate (Kouider & Dehaene, 2008; Pessoa, 2005), as well as the likelihood of 
embodied simulation in these conditions (Niedenthal et al., 2003) we wanted to be sure 
priming to be effective in our studies. By presenting primes supraliminaly we expected to 
increase the likelihood that simulation would be triggered. Also, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, by establishing prime exposure in 500ms there should have been enough time for 
differential EMG activity on the muscles of interest (Dimberg, 1997; Dimberg & Thunberg, 
1998) which would allow us to test if muscle activation played a role in the process. Short 
interstimulus intervals (<100ms) were used so that affective priming effects could emerge 
(Hermans et al., 2003).  
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In our study and similarly to Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) the prime was 
immediately followed by the target. Intertrial intervals were set to 6ms, so that the EMG 
activation that followed the presentation of each trial returned to baseline levels 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).  
 Experiment 1 was designed to clearly test the experimental paradigm and defined the 
category emotional priming effects just described. 
Our second aim was to directly test the hypothesis that muscle activity plays a role in 
emotional priming effects. For this purpose, we planned to add a blocking condition (see 
Section I Chapter 3) to the design defined in Experiment 1 using the procedure of Niedenthal 
and colleagues (2001). The goal was to show that this blocking of muscle activity impairs 
emotional priming, which would illuminate the role of embodiment in emotional priming 
effects. However, based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 of Section I, on the 
implication of blocking procedures on muscle activity, we realized that blocking may still 
allow partial muscle activity and for that reason, a blocking manipulation may be differently 
effective in blocking different muscles. If that is the case it would be logical not to expect 
priming effect to disappear equally in the happiness, sadness and anger prime-target pairs. In 
order to turn all this assumption clear, we developed a preliminary study (Experiment 2), 
addressing blocking procedure’s impact on muscle activity.  
If Experiment 2 corroborates the predictions that were enlightened by the literature of 
face muscle activity and blocking procedures, we would expect, blocking effects in priming, 
approach in experiment 3, to be qualified by emotion, suggesting a clear role of muscle 
activity in the process.  
 
Experiment 1: Priming emotion category effect 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
A total of 36 ISPA – Instituto Universitário’s undergraduates (89% Women), with 
ages ranging between 19 and 48 years (M=23.97; SD=7.36) were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of the mixed experimental design: 2 (Prime: present; absent) x 3 (Emotion of the 
prime: happy; sad; angry) x 3 (Relation prime-target: congruence prime-target;  
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incongruence prime-target; emotional prime-neutral target), being the emotion of the prime a 
between factor. 
 
Material 
Primes. Forty-eight faces expressing one of the three target emotions were randomly 
selected from The Karolinska Institute’s data base (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) - 16 
for each emotion for each emotion. All pictures were converted into gray scale, and in 5 x 5 
cm format. They were pre-tested for their emotional intensity and level of familiarity. All 
pictures were correctly associated with their emotion category. No differences were found in 
the intensity of their expression concerning the three groups of facial expression 
(Mhappy=4.58; SD=.20; Msad=4.41; SD=.20; Mangry=4.77; SD=.20; F(2,45)<1). There were no 
differences between the three sets of emotional primes in terms of familiarity (Mhappy=2.35; 
SD=.14.; Msad=2.17; SD=.14; Mangry=2.02; SD=.14; F(1,45)=1.39; p=.259; η2=.06).  
 
Targets. Four sets of eight words (see Appendix A) that were demonstrated in a pilot 
test to be related to a specific emotion: happiness, sadness, anger (more than 80% of pre-test 
subjects reported that association and less than 50% of participants associated it with other 
emotions) were defined as targets. A set of eight neutral words (words that fewer than 2% of 
the subjects associated with an emotion) were used as controls. 
 Words were matched for length in order to avoid differences in reading times 
associated to this variable. The four sets of words did not differ in their number of letters 
(Mhappy=7.75; SD=.77; Msad=7.50; SD=.77; Mangry=6.75; SD=.77; Mneutral=7.38; SD=.77; 
F(1,28)=.305; p=.821; η2=.03). Although we tried to equate words on level of familiarity, 
this was not possible regarding words related to happy emotion (Mhappy=5.89; SD=.24; 
Msad=4.98; SD=.24; Mangry=5.085; SD=.24; Mneutral=4.73; SD=.24; F(1,28)=.4.34; p=.012; 
η2=.32). Post-hoc tests revealed that only happy words were more familiar than neutral 
words, sad and angry (see Table 15, Appendix C). 
In each eight-word set, four were primed with a congruent facial expression, the 
remaining four were unprimed. 
A total of 32 filler targets were also presented. Fillers were words that established 
less clear associations to a specific emotion than those which were reserved to critical trials. 
This was reflected in the association to other emotions being higher than 50%.  Fillers were 
also primed with facial expressions. As the emotion of the prime was a between-subjects 
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factor, when one emotional prime was presented to the participant, the other remaining 
emotions served as fillers to match filler ambiguous targets. The inclusion of those emotions 
was done to disguise the objective of studying the impact of particular emotions.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was presented as a study of psycholinguistics, designed to test the 
speed of processing words in a computer task using E-prime v1.9 (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc., PA, USA). The participants were asked to evaluate words in a computer screen, 
according to a certain criterion. They were warned that each word could be preceded or not 
by a human face (presented supraliminally). The participants were told that these faces 
would be subject of a questionnaire, to be completed later. This procedure was included to 
justify the presence of the faces. Participant’s task was to decide if the words presented in 
the screen were or not emotional, by pressing the S or L key (counterbalanced between 
subjects). Each trial began, with a fixation point of 500 ms, followed by the facial expression 
presented for 500 ms (prime) and the target word which stayed on the screen until a response 
was given. There were a total of 64 trials (32 relevant and 32 fillers) being the inter-trial 
interval 4 seconds. Target trials were defined by strong emotionally associated words. These 
were associated with one specific emotion (happy vs. sad vs. anger) dependent upon the 
experimental condition participant was distributed to. Filler trials were defined by weaker 
emotional words and those were associated with a non relevant to condition facial 
expression.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Procedure of Experiment 1. 
 
All participants responded to a post experimental questionnaire that had the aim to 
reinforce the coverstory. In this questionnaire, they were presented with a group of faces, 
+  Hug
SOA 500ms 
 
 
         500 ms     500 ms    target/ response   4sec       timeline 
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and they had to report which ones were presented previously during the experimental task. 
After this, they were asked about the intents of the experiment. After responding to this 
questionnaire they were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
All participants reported seeing the faces. None reported an experimental intent close 
to the real purpose of the experiment. 
 
Reaction times 
Our first aim was to test for the presence of priming effects. Priming would imply 
that presenting an emotional face which emotion was congruent with the emotion of 
subsequent presented word. This congruence would elicit faster responses than for trials in 
which no congruent face was presented. Although we presented mean values in 
milliseconds, in order to test our hypothesis we first log transformed all RT’s. The logRT’s 
were entered into a three-way ANOVA, defined by the emotion primed as a between subject 
factor and both congruence vs. incongruence vs. neutral and primed vs. non-primed trials as 
within factors.  
The analysis yielded a main effect of prime (F(1,32)=5.91; p=.021; η2=.16). 
Responses were faster on primed trials (M=1197.59; SD=67.03) than on non prime primed 
trials (M=1352.94; SD=83.71) suggesting that the mere presence of an emotional face 
facilitated emotional judgments in general. 
As expected, the prime main effect was qualified (with marginal significance) by the 
relation that the prime and the target established - congruence, incongruence or neutral - 
(F(2,64)=2.63; p=.079; η2=.08). However this effect was due to a match between emotional 
prime and emotion judgment, and not the match between categories of emotions and targets. 
So, whereas emotional primed faces did not facilitate judgments of nonemotional neutral 
words (Mprimed-neutral=1264.29; SD=83.63; Mno prime-neutral=1209.30; SD=81.45; t(32)<1) 
priming was clearly present in other conditions.  Again consistent with a general effect, 
priming impact was present regardless of the level of congruence of the primed emotion and 
the emotional target to be judged. Thus, the difference between priming (M=1133.56; 
SD=81.05) and no priming condition (M=1475.00; SD=153.04) was greater for congruent 
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than the neutral words, suggesting the existence of a facilitation effect associated with 
congruence (t(32)=2.11; p=.042). But we also observed priming effects in incongruent trials, 
(Mno prime-incongruent=1194.91; SD=92.71; Mno prime-incongruent=1374.53; SD=97.70; (t(32)=1.97; 
p=.057). The magnitude of priming did not differ between congruent and incongruent trials 
(t(32)<1).  
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Figure 4. Interaction: Presence of the prime X Relation Prime – Target. 
 
The facilitation in incongruent trials could be interpreted as an emotional leakage 
effect, which was also found by Carroll and Young (2005). So whereas emotional faces 
independently of its emotion, were capable of facilitating a response regarding the emotional 
feature of an emotional target, no effect was found for judgments of the neutral targets. 
No other main effects or interactions were found (Appendix D), suggesting that the 
three sets of emotional primes promoted similar results (F(4,64)<1). 
 
Accuracy of responses 
Accuracy (percentage of correct responses) scores were subjected to an ARCSin 
transformation according to recommendations by Winer (1962). This transformation 
normalizes skewed distributions. Accuracy scores were analyzed within a mixed ANOVA 
design defined by the three levels emotional prime (happy, sad and angry) as a between 
subject factor and the two within factors: prime vs. no-prime and congruent vs. incongruent 
and neutral targets.  No effects were found. Not even the main effect of the prime F(1,32) 
=1.37; p=.250; η2=.04 or the Prime x Congruence interaction (F(2,66) <1). This pattern of 
results clearly suggests the existence of a trade-off between response times and accuracy. 
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Although there is a role of emotion in priming effects in this study, the restults do not 
support a specific category emotional priming effect. Perceiving a specific emotion did not 
clearly facilitate the judgment of a word that matched that same emotion in comparison to 
words that did not match the emotion. Contrary to our expectation, incongruent emotions 
facilitated the emotional judgment, in the same way facilitation was promoted by the 
congruent primes.  
Before accepting the present findings as evidence inconsistent with an emotion 
category priming hypothesis, we should think carefully what may be happening in these 
data. One possibility is that the difference is there, but that the low power of our analysis or 
other confounding does not allow its detection. Semantic characteristics of emotions may 
have caused a leakeage effect (Carroll & Young, 2005) becoming more difficult to detect the 
presence of a category priming effect. As we discussed in Chapter 3 of Section I, emotions 
share muscle activation. This muscle activity may be the reason for this apparent general 
emotion priming phenomena. If there is, in fact, an overlap in terms of muscle activity, this 
may lead to a general emotion priming effect, not being necessary to assume an overlap 
between semantic characteristics of emotions. To test this possibility we should block the 
muscular feedback and see general impact over all emotion judgments. In this experiment, 
several methodological flaws should be overcome in order to ensure that these results really 
suggest no evidence of  an emotion category priming effect. We should, thus, increase power 
in our analysis. This, because one possibility of having observed these resutls is that our 
statistical analysis lacks enough power to detect the effect. If the power of the analysis was 
the responsible for our data, increasing the power with more subjects would lead to an 
emergence of the categorical emotional priming in the free condition, and consequently a 
differential impact of the blocking manipulation for each emotion, as stated before. 
We addressed this methodological issue in an experiment that directly tested 
embodiment (Barsalou, 1999) as a suitable account for explaining emotional category 
priming effects, using the muscular blocking paradigm. This procedure is assumed to 
prevent any facial configuration associated with any emotion in particular. From the 
procedures reviewed in Chapter 3 Niedenthal and colleagues (2001) manipulation seems to 
be more effective in preventing mimicry of the lower face, and was thus selected for our 
purposes. However, it is unclear which facial muscles this manipulation act on. Without such 
knowledge we are not able to interpret the findings of studies using this manipulation. Thus 
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Experiment 2, was developed as a pilot study to clarify the impact of the procedure on 
muscle activity. 
 
Experiment  2:  Pilot study of the Niedenthal et al’s (2001) blocking procedure 
 
Here we tested muscle activity associated with Niedenthal and colleagues’ (2001) 
blocking procedure, by associating it with EMG measures of three muscle regions. 
 The advantage of learning which specific muscles are engaged when a muscular 
manipulation is performed would be enormous as was suggested by Oberman and 
colleagues’ (2007) work, who tested the muscular involvement of a specific blocking 
procedure. Their blocking procedure required participants to actively hold a pen in the 
mouth sideways, without touching it with their lips. The manipulation was shown to create a 
hyperactivation of a variety of muscles (zygomaticus, levator, buccinator and orbicularis 
oris).  In their paper Oberman and colleagues argued that Niedenthal’s and colleagues’ 
(2001) procedure was not associated with that type of hyperactivation. Oberman and her 
team (2007), assumed it as a passive procedure that prevents the participants from 
generating muscular signal.  Although this seemed to be a best blocking procedure, because 
of that characteristic, the truth is that we have no data that suggests that to be so.  Moreover, 
we have not evidence on which muscles are the target of this manipulation. 
 In order to assess the specific effects of the Niedenthal and colleagues (2001) 
blocking manipulation on facial musculature, we instructed subjects to perform the 
manipulation and used EMG to recorde concurrent activation of their facial muscles. If the 
procedure impaired the generation of muscular signal (as assumed by Oberman and 
colleagues), activity of muscles should decrease. If blocking means creating noise (as in the 
case of the Oberman procedure), then the prediction should be that blocking increased 
muscle activity.  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Eleven ISPA’s undergraduates students (91% women), were randomly assigned to 
the conditions defined by the following within subject design: 3 (Muscle: zygomaticus 
major; corrugator supercilii; orbicularis oris) x 2 (Mimicry: blocked; free).  
 
Procedure 
 Upon the arrival to the laboratory participants were informed the experiment would 
involve the collection of physiological measures, and for that reason electrodes should be 
attached to the skin. The experimenter explained that the procedures would constitute no 
harm for the participant. And the participant was also invited to pose any questions related to 
the equipment. 
Then, the experimenter rubbed their skin with alcohol in order clean the participant’s 
skin, so that the electrodes could be efficiently attached to zygomaticus, corrugator and 
orbicularis oris, 
 
Figure 5. Measured muscles 
 
Then, our study was presented to the participants as a pre-test of a manipulation that 
interfered with sub vocal activity. 
The participants were asked, in random order, to adopt the Niedenthal’s and 
colleagues’ (2001) blocking procedure or to stay in a free mimicry condition. In the blocking 
Corrugator Supercilii 
Zygomaticus Major 
Orbicularis Oris
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mimicry condition, participants were asked to “hold a pen sideways with the teeth and lips 
with a slight pressure”, while the computer showed a photo exemplifying how the pen 
should be held.  
 
 
Figure 6. Niedenthal and colleagues’ (2001) blocking procedure (Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). 
 
Participants were told that they would keep the pen after the experiment so that they 
could be sure that the same pen had not been used by other participants. Even so, alcohol 
was available in case the participant felt the necessity to disinfect the pen. 
After being in the correct position, participants were asked to maintain it during 6 
seconds, just looking at a fixation point. After this, participants were debriefed, thanked and 
dismissed.  
 
EMG measurement. EMG was used to assess activity of muscles. We monitored 
the activity in the cheek region by recording the activity of zygomaticus major (the muscle 
that raises de lip corner), orbicularis oris (responsible for protruding lips and inverting them) 
and corrugator (which approximates eye brows. 
 Muscle activity was measured with pairs of adjacent silver/silver-chloride electrodes 
placed on the left side of the participant’s face. An additional ground electrode was placed in 
the upper portion of the forehead. The impedance was reduced to less than 10 kΩ. The 
attachment of the electrodes was performed according Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). The 
acquisition of the signal was through MP150 Amplifiers and Acknowledge 3.1 by BIOPAC 
(BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA). The gain was 5000, and data was filtered online with 
a lowpass filter of 100Hz and a highpass filter of 1.0Hz and sampled at 1000 times per 
second. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
In order to understand the pattern of activation of the 3 muscles during the blocking 
manipulation, EMG measures were first integrated (root mean square) and rectified as well 
as screened for movement artefacts. Data were standardized within subjects and muscle 
sites, attenuating the impact highly reactive participants. The data used refers, , to the 
average EMG activity of the period between the 2nd second and the 6th second after the 
presentation of the instructions, as in Oberman and colleagues’ (2007). 
 
These data were submitted to a two-way ANOVA according to the design (3 muscle 
x 2  mimicry). Against the idea was that blocking procedure prevents muscle activity no 
main effect of the free vs. blocking mimicry manipulation was found (F(1,10)=1.55; p=.241; 
η2=.13). The absence of a main effect seems to indicate that the general activity of the face 
was no different from the free mimicry condition compared to the blocked mimicry. 
However, and most relevant, the analysis yielded an interaction between those two factors 
(F(2,20)=6.30; p=.008; η2=.39) suggesting that blocking was related differently to specific 
muscle activity. Exploring this interaction, we found that blocking produced more activation 
of the zygomaticus (M=.81; SD=.29) than the free condition (M=-.23; SD= .18; t(10)=2.52; 
p=.031). In the case of orbicularis this difference was not enough to reach common levels of 
significance (Mblocked=.41; SD=.30; Mfree=-.30; SD=.15; t(10)=1.74; p=.112,). And in the case 
of corrugator its activity was less when the participant was holding the pen than when no 
manipulation was required. (Mblocked=-.40; SD=.25; Mfree=.63; SD=.22; t(10)= 2.51; p=.031).  
In general, this pattern of results corroborate the idea of Oberman and collegues 
(2007) that blocking promotes muscle activation, but that this procedure is more effective in 
blocking lower facial muscle than the upper ones (e.g. corrugator) as Nidenthal suggested. 
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Figure 7. Interaction: Muscle x Mimicry. 
 
Our analysis initially examined average muscle activity. However, because muscle 
activity is an over-time phenomenon, differences may be found not only in the means of the 
mean of the particular distribution for each subject, but also on the means of the standard 
deviations that characterize that distribution. Thus, it may be the case that the manipulation 
not only impacted its mean activation, but it also reduced the natural activity of the muscle, 
freezing its natural changes of activity. In order to investigate this possible effect of 
blocking, that is, the impact on the variability of muscle activity, we analyzed the standard 
deviations of the activity, which had been submitted to an Arcsin transformation.  
 Blocking did not differ from free mimicry with regard to the variability observed in 
general muscle activity (F(2,9)=1.38; p=.269; η2=.13), or specific muscle activity (no 
interaction F(2,18)<1). These null effects seems to discard the idea that block is synonym of 
a hyperactivation that freezes the muscle in one level of activity, promoting less variability 
in degree, if muscle activity states than free mimic.  
Concluding, we verified that Nidenthal and colleagues’ (2001) procedure was 
operating through a process of activating zygomaticus. Orbicularis oris also seemed but not 
in an effective way.  
We suspect that the high activity of corrugator reported in free mimicry was 
promoted by participants’ attention mobilization to the fixation point during the task while 
waiting for instructions. Blocking seems in some way to prevent this activation, either 
because of the procedure itself or because of interfering with this attention mobilization. 
 In the discussion of Experiment 1, we posed the hypothesis that emotion priming is 
driven by embodiment features.  In Experiment 3 we introduced a blocking procedure with 
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the prediction that it would influence priming. If priming is general as suggested by 
experiment 1 (and not a question of power in analysis) blocking should interfere with the 
general effect. However, priming has a category component we expected the interference on 
priming by the blocking procedure to be qualified by type of emotion that was primed. 
Anger may provide a less stronger evidence of blocking, since the brow movement seems to 
be less disturbed by the procedure itself as observed in Experiment 2 (Niedenthal et al., 
2009).  Blocking may provide the stronger disruption of the priming effect associated with 
happiness, since this emotion recruits more muscular resources that should be occupied with 
this effortful pose (Oberman et al., 2007). A third pattern of results may be that the priming 
effect, whatever its form (category based or general) persists in blocking conditions. This 
would suggest that embodiment does not have a role in explaing emotion priming effects. 
 
Experiment 3: Blocking the priming emotion category effect 
 
This study replicated Experiment 1 in a free mimicry condition and added to it a 
blocked mimicry condition. The addition of such condition would be helpful in explaining 
the general priming effect of emotions we observed in the previous experiment. If no 
embodied component was involved in the priming effect there is no parsimonious reason for 
the blocking of the muscular feedback to interfere in the performance of the above-described 
emotional priming. By increasing the number of participants we expected to clarify the 
results obtained regarding emotion congruence and incongruence effects, in the free mimicry 
condition. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
Sixty-four ISPA’s undergraduate students (84.33% women), between 17 and 42 years 
(M=22.13; SD=6.49) were randomly assigned to the conditions of the experimental design: 2 
(Prime: present; absent) x 3 (Emotion of the prime: happy; sad; angry) x 3 (Relation prime-
target: congruence prime-target; incongruence prime-target; emotional prime-neutral target) 
x 2 (Mimicry: free; blocked), being the emotion of the prime and mimicry  between factors. 
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Material  
For the present experiment, the set of material used was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Forty-eight primes of facial expressions (happy, sad, and angry) were selected from 
Karolinska Database. In each between emotion prime condition, 16 were critical primes of a 
specific emotion, and 32 were fillers of the remaining emotions.  
In addition, a pool of 32 words critical targets was selected. Eight critical words were 
associated with each emotion (above 75% of association to a specific emotion, and bellow 
50% of association to other emotions) and eight were neutral stimuli (never associated more 
than 2% to any emotion). Those words were controlled both for familiarity and length. There 
were also 32 filler ambiguous words pairing with the filler primes. The fillers were words 
that were more weakly associated with the emotion (less than 50%) and linked to a face 
expression not related to the emotion to be primed in that experimental condition.  
 
Procedure  
The participants followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1. In brief, 
participants were supraliminally exposed to facial expressions, which were then followed by 
a target word. All participants learned that some words would be preceded by a face and 
others would not. They were further instructed that their task was to judge whether the word 
was an emotion word or not. 
However, this time, half of the participants were assigned to a mimicry-blocked 
condition in which the procedure followed that used by (Niedenthal et al., 2001), was 
employed.  
Participants were told that we gave the used pens as gifts to its correspondent users, 
guaranteeing the same pen was never used by two different participants. In spite of this, we 
additionally let the participants rub the pen with alcohol, in case this made them feel more 
confident about the hygienic conditions of the experiment. When participants indicated that 
they were comfortable and adopted in the required position, the experimenter gave the signal 
to the participant initiate the task. Free mimicry participants were told to begin right after 
they read the instructions of the decision task. After they concluded all emotional decision 
trials, they were thanked and debriefed. 
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Results 
 
The data were analyzed in order to a) understand if we replicated the pattern obtained 
in experiment 1; b) see if mimicry condition moderated that pattern and c) better understand 
how blocking impacted the effects on priming on of word emotional judgment process.  
 
Reaction Times 
Analysis of the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1. Along with what was 
observed in Experiment 1, a main effect of priming was found (F(1,31)=6.13; p=.019) 
η2=.17 Primed targets were more quickly judged as emotional (M=688.43; SD=52.02) than 
no primed targets (M=772.05; SD=70.37). This replicated general priming effect observed in 
Experiment 1. 
In addition to what was found in Experiment 1, we also found evidence of categorical 
emotional priming. The main effect of the level of congruence (F(2,62)=3.89; p=.026; 
η2=.11) was significant. As expected, congruent trials were associated with quicker reactions 
(M=723.82; SD=69.20) than incongruent trials (M=794.46; SD=74.83). Non emotional 
words (M=672.42; SD=42.87) were faster to be judged as non emotional than were positive 
identifications of emotional words as emotional. The interaction between presence vs 
absence of a prime and the level of congruence between the prime and the target 
(F(2,62)=3.16; p=.050; η2=.09), reveal that whereas primed congruent pairs were processed 
faster prime did not affect incongruent and neutrals targets. This indicates that each category 
of emotion is mostly facilitated by stimulus of the same emotional category rather than from 
different emotional category, contrary to what happened in the previous experiment. 
Leanding to the conclusion there is specificity when we are priming emotions and that 
effects of Experiment 1 may be just a case of power in analysis. 
These effects were moderated by the category of emotion that was primed 
(F(4,62)=2.46; p=.054; η2=.14). As this moderation does not involve the factor that defines 
if the prime is present or absence means that when we refer to happy prime condition, for 
example means that there were not only happy prime trials but also non-primed trials that 
were presented in a happy priming context.  
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For the angry context, we found no effect of levels of congruence (t<1). The effect is 
both present in a happy prime context, (t(31)=2.67; p=.012) and in the sad context 
(t(31)=2.41; p=.022).  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Happy Sad Angry
Emotion of the Prime
R
T'
s (
m
s) Congruent
Incongruent
Prime-Neutral Target
 
Figure 8. Interaction: Relation Prime-Target x Primed Emotion 
 
Relevant for a better understanding of these pattern of results, they were found to be 
moderated by the priming factor (F=(4,62)=2.22; p=.077; η2=.13). The pattern of results 
previously described was mainly associated with the priming conditions (see Fig. 9).  
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Figure 9. Interaction: Relation Prime-Target x Primed Emotion, for primed trials 
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Figure 10. Interaction: Relation Prime-Target x Primed Emotion, for non-primed trials 
 
There was an unexpected effect of word category in the no-prime trials in the sad 
condition. Notice that targets are only congruent or incongruent with regard to that particular 
prime. Non-primed words should not be affected by target manipulations (since they were 
simply not present).  This data seems to suggest that an overall context of sadness was 
primed in that set of subjects. That is, although we have included several fillers with other 
emotions, in order to prevent that the prime was still activated across primed and non primed 
trials, it seems that the prevalent occurrence of sad primes turn it more likely to be activated. 
However we found no reason why the effects of this higher relative frequency of one type of 
prime over the others, that would spilled over to the non-prime conditions, is only found in 
the sad condition. 
 
Blocking effect. We expected that the pattern of effects obtained in the free mimicry 
condition would change with blocked mimicry, as a function of each emotion. As 
Experiment 2 has shown anger should be less affected by the manipulation, corrugator is 
still free to mimic this emotion. In the case of orbicularis impairment in the priming effect 
should be observed since this manipulation involves an effort in the lower face.  Happiness 
is the emotion that should be most affected by this blocking manipulation. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we added the blocking condition to the design. A 
mixed ANOVA comprising mimicry conditions (blocking vs. free), the type of prime as a 
between factor and prime vs. no-prime and congruent, incongruent vs. neutral targets as 
within factors was performed. 
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Blocking didn’t have the impact on reaction times that we would expect if it clearly 
moderated priming. First, because there was no blocking main effect (F<1). Second, because 
a clear main effect of priming was identified (F(1,58)=20.99; p<.000; η2=.27), such that 
prime trials (M=682.70; SD=49.91) produced faster responses than non-primed trials 
(M=785.31; SD=55.14). Third, because the highly marginal qualification of this effect by 
blocking F(1,58)=2,87; p=.095; η2=.05) revealed exactly the opposite effect we would 
expect if blocking was expected to prevent the effect.  The free mimicry condition promoted 
a difference in RT associated with prime and non primed trials smaller (Difference Mprime - 
Mno prime=83.62) than the one verified in the blocking conditions (Difference Mprime - Mno 
prime=121.61).  
Blocking effects (as preventing the muscle representation of a construct) should be 
found in the moderation of two interaction effects: the Priming x Congruence interaction and 
the three-way interaction. However, neither the first moderation, reflected in the three-way 
interaction defined by Mimicry x Priming x Level of congruence of targets, reached levels of 
significance (F(4,116) <1), nor the second moderation reflected in the four-way interaction 
Mimicry x Priming x Level of congruence of Taget x Emotion did achieve significance 
(F<1).   
It should be concluded from this analysis that blocking mimicry did not impact in any 
way the judgmental task participants were engaged into?   
That does not seem to be the case since blocking moderated some relevant 
interactions. The interaction between level of congruence and the emotion that was primed 
(F(4,58)= 3,54 p<.009; η2=.11) was moderated by blocking (three-way interaction F(4,58)= 
2,54 p<.043; η2=.08). Since there is no interpretation of the effect of prime manipulation 
(reflecting level of congruence) without this factor, we further explore priming effects 
isolated by condition free vs. block, directly testing our predictions as planned comparisons. 
Notice that our predictions, being derived from our pilot study are more precise than the 
general main effects or interactions previously presented. 
Enlightened by Experiment 2 we expected that blocking would have an effect that is 
specific to particular emotions (see Figs. 11 and 12, below). This specificity is corroborated 
by the interaction found between prime and type of emotion primed (F(2,58)= 4,41 p=.016; 
η2=.13) which was moderated by mimicry condition (F(2,58)= 5,34 p=.007; η2=.16). 
Priming effects obtained in free conditions were changed by blocking with regard to 
happiness (eliminating it) and anger (accentuating it). The facilitating effect of happy primes 
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in the free condition (Mprime=675.49; SD=115.00; Mno-prime=734.28; SD=127.04; t(58)=1.88; 
p=.065) totally disappeared when mimicry was blocked (t(58)<1). On the contrary, the 
facilitation effect of sad primes in free mimicry (Mprime=769.48; SD=120.11; Mno-
prime=957.33; SD=132.69; (t(58)=1.73; p=.090), was made clear in blocking condition 
(Mprime=547.89; SD=125.98; Mno-prime=828.18; SD=139.17; t(58)=5.15; p<.000). 
Interestingly, non-exiting effect of angry primes in free mimicry (t(58)<1) became visible 
when the blocking procedure was applied (Mprime=527.04; SD=125.98; Mno-prime=738.02; 
SD=139.17; t(58)=2.87; p=.006). 
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Figure 11. Interaction: Presence of the prime x Primed Emotion, for free individuals 
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Figure 12. Interaction: Presence of the prime x Primed Emotion, for blocked individuals 
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Accuracy 
Due to very low variance, no analysis could be performed on the proportion of 
correct responses. 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 3, together with the first experiment, revealed a reliable general 
emotional priming effect.  Priming emotional words with emotional faces facilitated 
judgments of emotionality of those words independently of the specific emotion. Suggesting 
that the effect could be priming the concept of emotion itself since incongruent trials were 
also facilitated when compaired to neutral ones, in Experiment 1. The increased statistical 
power of Experiment 3 suggests that the difference observed in Experiment 1 between 
congruent and incongruent trials is reliable. Thus, the findings of Experiment 3 indicate the 
presence of an emotion congruence effect. In fact, the congruence effect was clearly present 
at least on a happiness and sadness context. Anger contexts are not so clear in its effects. 
We assume that facial muscle activity and its superimposed activation in different 
emotions, could explain the pattern of effects observed. Thus, preventing participants from 
mimicking should be expected to increase RT’s and destroy any facilitation effects of 
priming at least in some emotions, such as happiness. The pattern of data associated with 
happiness is congruent with our predictions. Priming effects disappeared in the blocking 
condition. The same did not happen with the other two emotions. Notice however that we 
hypothesised that the blocking manipulation could be inoperative on muscles associated to 
sadness or anger. By having these muscles in activity, they may be supporting the 
superimposed activation of all emotions, and thus make clear the general emotional priming 
effects found in Experiment 1. Not only was category priming present for sadness and anger 
in the block-mimicry conditions, but also the blocking increased priming effects on 
judgments of word emotionality under the sad and anger conditions.   
The blocking of mimicry helped to reveal the role of embodiment in emotion 
priming. Preventing the expected effect. However the increase of the effect under sad and 
anger, by blocking was something not expected. Why could this happen? The answer should 
be in the specificities of our blocking procedure. One possibility is that the blocking 
procedure acts not only upon the amount of activity that is generated by the muscle (as it was 
the case of the zygomaticus) but also over muscle movement properties, that is to say, the 
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ability of the muscle to change its own state.  If this is the case, it would be this “prevention 
of change” that promoted the impact of blocking on “happiness”. If muscle change is what is 
relevant in the embodiment features engaged in the priming effects, we should, for example, 
assume that change of muscles as a reaction to  anger and sad stimuli is higher under 
blocking procedure than under free conditions, in order to explain the increasing of priming 
effects observed in this experiment. 
The “change hypothesis” could be refuted with the evidence we had in Experiment 2. 
Remember that, although blocking impact muscle activity, it did not impact its variability 
(see Experiment 2). However, in that study our subjects were not reacting to any stimulus.  
So it was not possible to know if “muscle change in activity”, under blocking instructions 
was prevented or increased. In order to know that, we should promote muscle changes under 
blocking instructions. Both Experiment 4 and 5 had that goal in order to investigate the 
hypothesis that blocking involved the idea of impairment of muscular change in voluntary 
and involuntary facial action. In line with the results of Experiment 3, we expected that the 
blocking procedure produces a kind of a ceiling effect in the activation of zygomaticus. We 
expected that the manipulation activated the zygomaticus above a threshold that makes it 
unable to move (change its state). We will name this as freezing activation effect. This 
difficulty in changing its activation should be revealed, when we promoted a change in the 
musculature through requiring the subjects to voluntarly produce facial expressions or when 
we induce a more subtle change of activity in muscles promoted by the presentation of an 
emotional photo. On the contrary, since orbicularis oris did not show in Experiment 2 the 
same kind of hyperactivation as zygomaticus, we did not expect freezing activation  effect, 
but an activation that still allows the muscle to move. We do not expect any interference of 
the manipulation on the activity of corrugator. 
 
Experiment 4: Testing muscle change hypothesis requesting voluntary facial 
expressions 
 
In the present experiment we investigated the hypothesis of the notion of blocking 
involving the idea of impairment of muscular change. We asked participants to make 
deliberate facial expressions while performing the blocking manipulation. Our analysis was 
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centered on zygomaticus and facial expression mostly associated to it: the smile, once it was 
the muscle which revealed to be most affected by the blocking manipulation.  
If change is the feature in which our manipulation is acting over, participants 
wouldn’t be able to activate the zygomaticus more than it is already activated when they 
perform the blocking task. For the corrugator we did not expect any particular difference.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
Twelve ISPA’s undergraduates students (50% women), with ages ranging between 
22 e 31 years (M=27.92; SD=2.31) were randomly assigned to the within subject design: 3 
(Muscle: zygomaticus major; corrugator supercilii; orbicularis oris) x 2 (Mimicry: blocked; 
free) x 3 Facial expression requested: happy; angry; none). 
 
 
Procedure 
Again, participants were informed this experiment would involve the collection of 
physiological measures, and for that reason electrodes would be attached to the skin. The 
experimenter explained that procedures would constitute no harm for the participant. 
Participants had the opportunity of posing questions about the equipments so they were 
made comfortable with the procedures. After this, the experimenter rubbed their skin with 
alcohol. 
Participants performed two blocks of trials in which they had to voluntarily produce 
facial expressions of happiness, anger or no expression at all, for 5 seconds. In one block, the 
participants performed the task in free mimicry, in the other the participants had their 
mimicry blocked with Niedenthal and colleagues’ procedure. Again we recorded the activity 
of zygomaticus, orbicularis and corrugator according to Fridlund and Cacioppo’s (1986)  
recommendations. Each condition was repeated three times. This technique of performing 
holding a pen while performing facial expressions was fully developed by us and no other 
study was found to do this. 
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EMG measurement. Muscle activity was measured with pairs of adjacent 
silver/silver-chloride electrodes placed on the left side of the participant’s face. An 
additional ground electrode was placed in the upper portion of the forehead. The impedance 
was reduced to less than 10 kΩ. The attachment of the electrodes was performed according 
Cacioppo, Tassinary and Fridlund, (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Fridlund, 1990). The acquisition 
of the signal was through MP150 Amplifiers and Acknowledge 3.1 by Biopac. The gain was 
5000, and data was filtered online with a lowpass filter of 100Hz and a highpass filter of 
1.0Hz and sampled at 1000 times per second.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
EMG measures were integrated (root mean square) and rectified and screened for 
movement artefacts. Data were standartized within subjects and muscle sites, attenuating the 
impact highly reactive participants.  
In order to test our hypothesis, data were submitted to a three-way ANOVA, defined 
by the following factors: Muscle x Facial Expression x Mimicry. We were expecting a three-
way interaction. This is because we assumed the blocking to impair the zygomaticus 
activation when a smile is requested. That is, its level of activation, should not be overcame 
by the over imposed smile. In addition, we do not expect an activation of the orbicularis or 
corrugator, when the blocking is promoted, since in  Experiment 2 both muscles were 
shown not to be sensitive to the procedure (at least when compared to the zygomaticus), and 
this should not occur when a smile is superimposed to it, also. These two muscles, however, 
are expected to be activated by the anger expression, which we do not assume to be blocked 
by our blocking procedure. So differences between anger and not anger conditions are 
expected. 
Before focusing these specific hypothesis we analysed our data in order to: a)  assure 
that instructions regarding facial expressions created the expected muscular activity 
(increased activity over the zygomaticus when smiling and increased activity for the 
corrugator when frowning) and to b) verify the pattern of activation promoted by the 
blocking procedure, as characterized by Experiment 2: activation over the zygomaticus and 
non significant results for orbicularis oris or corrugator.   
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Instruction seem to be effective, since the analysis of data associated with the free 
mimicry condition allowed us to confirm that the different facial expressions had an impact 
on the general activity of the face t(11)=6.38; p<.000. 
Also a main effect was found for emotion (F(2, 22)=24.887; p<.000; η2=.69), 
expressed in a linear trend t(11)=6.06; p<.000 between the three expressions. Frowning 
expression (M=.33; SD=.06) produced more activity than smiling (M=-.01; SD=.04) which 
in turn, was responsible for more activity than no expression at all (M=-.33; SD=.06). This 
effect was impacted the by various muscles (F(4, 44)=37.83; p<.000; η2=.77). Frown 
(Mfrown=1.23; SD=.17) produced higher levels of corrugator’s activity than the other two 
expression conditions (Msmile=-.65; SD=.09; Mno-expression=-.58; SD=.09; t(11)=7.16; p<.000). 
For zygomaticus we found a linear trend (t(11)=3.76; p=.003): smile (M=.40; SD=.12)  was 
the expression condition which produced a greater increase in the activity followed by frown 
(M=-.12; SD=.07) and no expression condition (Mno-expression=-.28; SD=.07). Concerning the 
orbicularis oris activity we can say that smile (Msmile=.23; SD=.06) triggered its activity in a 
larger extent than the remaining conditions (Mfrown=-.11; SD=.05; Mno-expression=-.12; SD=.06; 
t(11)=3.25; p=.008). 
 
-1,00
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
Corrugador Supercilii Zygomaticus Major Orbicularis Oris
Muscle
Z
(A
ct
iv
ity
) Smile
Frown
No Expression
Figure 13. Interaction: Muscle x Expression. 
 
Analysing the control condition where no expression was induced, we expected to 
confirm the pattern of muscle activation associated with the blocking procedure t(11)=4.83; 
p=.001). Contrary to Experiment 2, we found a main effect of mimicry (F(1, 11)=13.75; 
p=.003; η2=.55), meaning that, blocked mimicry (M=.22; SD=.06) produced higher values of 
activity than free mimicry condition (M=-.22; SD=.06).  As in Experiment 2 we found this 
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activity to be qualified by the type of muscle in question (F(2, 22)=16.497; p<.000; η2=.60). 
As in Experiment 2, zygomaticus in the blocking condition produced more activity than free 
mimicry condition (Mblocked=.28; SD=.10 ; Mfree=-.28; SD=.10; t(11)=2.99; p=.012). Now, the 
effect of orbicularis, that was not significant in Experiment 2, achieved significance 
(Mblocked=.44; SD=.09; Mfree=-.44; SD=.09; t(11)=4.97; p<.000 ). No effect was found for the 
corrugator. For this muscle, any significant difference emerged between blocked and free 
condition (Mblocked=-.05; SD=.04 ; Mfree=.05; SD=.04; t(11)=-1.34; p=.208), suggesting that 
the muscle was not activated by our procedure, as in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 14. Interaction: Muscle x Mimicry. 
 
No evidence of any other two-way, (F(2,22)=2.08; p=.149; η2=.16) or three-way 
interaction (F(4, 44)=1.11; p=.365; η2=.09) interaction involving mimicry was found. 
In order to test our hypothesis, regarding how blocking prevent “change”, we 
computed the interaction Muscle x Mimicry x Expression.  Contrary to what we expected, 
this effect was not significant. However, given the focus of our hypothesis, we found, 
planned contrasts to be an useful tool to answer them. 
We analyzed zygomaticus’ activity. In free condition, as expected, this muscle  was 
recruited to a larger extent when the participant was required to smile than required to stay 
with no expression (Msmile=.02; SD=.19; Mno-expression=-.53; SD=.07; t(11)=2.76; p=.019).  
However, this pattern of results does not seem to differ from blocked mimicry,  (t(11)<1), 
meaning that the blocking procedure wasn’t able to impair the variation that had origin in the 
smiling instruction. 
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Figure 15. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Zygomaticus. 
 
As concerns orbicularis oris’ activity, we observed that it was recruited when in the 
free condition the participant was required to smile. In fact its activation was higher than 
when participants were simply required to stay with no expression (Msmile=-.20; SD=.17; 
Mno-expression=.57; SD=.08; t(11)=2.83; p=.016). The muscle was not activated when 
participants were asked to frown, not differing from the no expression condition (t(11)<1). 
The orbicularis oris seemed to be activated by the instruction of smile when compared to the 
control condition where no expression was required. This pattern of activation of orbicularis 
in smiling seems to be consistent both for blocked and free conditions, meaning that no 
significant difference was found (t(11)<1) between the two patterns. Again, no effects of 
blocking in priming task could be attributed to this muscle.  
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Figure 16. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Orbicularis Oris. 
 
Regarding the corrugator, as expected, in free condition this muscle was recruited in 
a larger extent when the participant was required to frown than in the no expression 
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condition (Msmile=1.45; SD=.21; Mno-expression=-.57; SD=.12; t(11)=6.59; p<.000).  This 
muscle was also activated under blocking condition when individuals were asked to frown. 
Although this activation seemed to be less than the one verified in individuals which were 
freely frowning, (t(11)=1.81; p=.097). The absence of a difference between blocking and 
free patterns was consistent with the fact that the manipulation was not able to eliminate the 
variation imposed by the frowning instruction.  
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Figure 17. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Corrugator. 
 
At this point, we know that Niedenthal’s blocking:  
1) Promotes the activation of the zygomaticus and the orbicularis oris, but not the 
corrugator’s (Experiment 2),   
2) Does not prevent changes of activations resulting from the production of 
voluntary facial expressions, (Experiment 4). The fact that zygomaticus and the 
orbicularis were able to change their state during the blocking procedure means 
that it was not completely efficient in preventing a forced smile. The corrugator 
is also able to change its state when a forced frown was superimposed.  
 
Notice that the fact that this blocking was not able to prevent changes in the 
orbicularis, helps to explain the pattern of results in Experiment 3. The fact that the 
manipulation allowed orbicularis to move, suits the data that revealed the priming effect 
associated with sadness didn’t disappear when the blocking was introduced. Should be also 
assumed that the zygomaticus is also able to change and so the null effects observed in 
Experiment 3 were not caused by blocking itself? Although it is possible, one question is 
here opened. The fact that we observed activation under instructions of a forced smile does 
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not mean necessarily that it would not interfere with a spontaneous activation. Thus, the 
present study leaves room to speculate whether the manipulation is not able to impair the 
production of explicit facial expressions, as smile but is able to impair the production of 
subtle muscular movements which arise during the exposure to emotional stimuli, similar to 
the primes used in Experiment 1 and 3, and suffered behavioural impact of this 
manipulation. To test this hypothesis we ran a study in which we exposed participants to 
photos of emotional facial expressions that subtly would trigger muscle activation, that we, 
in the present experiment activated by explicit instructions. 
 
Experiment 5: Testing muscle change hypothesis under involuntary conditions 
of muscle activation 
 
Although blocking procedure under the request of voluntary change in the facial 
expression of the individual did not disable the individual to perform this change, we found 
necessary to test the hypothesis of this impairment occurring if the muscular change was 
promoted under involuntary conditions. For this reason, we ran a study in which the 
muscular change was induced by the exposure to supraliminal photos of facial expressions, 
in similar conditions than those in Experiments 1 and 3.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-one ISPA’s undergraduate students (81% women), between 18 and 58 years 
(M=26.77; SD=10.49) were randomly assigned for the within subject design: 3 Muscle 
(zygomaticus major vs. corrugator supercilii vs. orbicularis oris) x 2 Mimicry (blocked vs. 
free) x 4 Facial expression (happy vs. angry vs. sad vs. none). 
 
Materials 
In the present study, we used the previous set of facial expressions from Karolinska 
database (16 happy, 16 angry and 16 sad expressions). 
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Procedure  
 After participants were informed that the experiment involved attaching electrodes to 
the skin, the experimenter assured them that the procedures constituted no harm for the 
participant. The participant was then given the opportunity to raise any questions about the 
equipments. Skin cleansing and electrode attachment was performed. The participants were 
asked in a random order to adopt the blocking procedures introduced in the previous 
experiments. After being in the correct position, participants were asked to just look at facial 
expressions which would appear on the screen for 500 and preceeded by a fixation point that 
lasted on the screen for 500ms. The intertrial interval was 6 seconds. When the experiment 
began, participants were exposed to facial expression, just looking at a fixation point.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
EMG data refers to the temporal window of priming in the first priming studies 
between 350 and 450 milliseconds. Since activations are detected between 300 and 500 ms, 
we decided to start the measurement at 350 ms and stop at 450 ms after the onset of the 
prime, discarding the last 50 ms of the prime exposure due to response artefacts. Again, 
EMG measures were integrated (root mean square) and rectified and screened for movement 
artefacts. Data were standartized within subjects and muscle sites, attenuating the impact 
highly reactive participants.  
In order to test our hypothesis regarding the efficiency of the blocking procedure, 
data was submitted to a three-way ANOVA defined by the following factors: Muscle 
(corrugator vs. zygomaticus vs. orbicularis oris); Emotional Expression (happy vs. sad vs. 
angry vs. no expression); Mimicry (blocked vs. free). We expected a three-way interaction 
associated with a different pattern of activations associated with each muscle. So that 
spontaneous reaction of a smile or a frown would change muscle activation in a blocking 
condition. At least, with regard to the zygomaticus which was not expected to overcome the 
activation know already to be associated with the blocking procedure itself.  
 The three-way ANOVA, revealed the already known general effect of blocking 
(F=(1, 30)= 12.90; p=.001; η2=.30), producing higher levels of activation than the free 
mimicry condition (Mblocked=.60; SD=.21; Mfree=.19; SD=.05). The effect was a again more 
accentuated with regard to the zygomaticus and less regarding the corrugator, as revealed by 
the Muscle x Mimicry interaction (F=(2,60)=5.68; p=.005; η2=.16). Zygomaticus had higher 
74 
  
  
  
values of activity for the blocked condition (M=.55; SD=.08) than for free condition (M=-
.33; SD=.08; t(30)=6.18; p<.000). The same has happened for orbicularis oris (Mblocked=1.29; 
SD=.60; Mfree=-.34; SD=.10; t(30)=2.68; p=.012). For the corrugator, no differences arose 
between free and blocked mimicry conditions (t(30)=.71; p=.483). 
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Figure 18. Interaction: Muscle x Mimicry. 
 
As in the previous experiment the general three-way Muscle x Mimicry x Emotion 
interaction was not significant (F=(4, 120)=.94; p=.442; η2=.03). However  our hypothesis 
are defined by focused questions associated with specific effects, interactions and specific 
pattern of these interactions regarding each muscle, which we will approach separately. 
Our expectation, regarding the zygomaticus was that emotional stimuli would 
promote more changes relative to a baseline of non-expression in the free conditions than 
blocking. We contrasted different emotions (+1; +1; +1) to its baseline of non expression (-
3) in the two experimental mimicry conditions (1; -1) and found a null effect t(30)<1). 
However this null effect can hide a specific pattern of effects that would be only observed in 
the free condition. So we tested the significance of the  pattern of activation observed in the 
data (see Figure 19)   defined by  a linear trend  (t(30)=2.30; p=.028) which has happy photo 
eliciting more activation, followed by the angry and  control conditions, being less activated 
in the sad condition (Mhappy=-.23; SD=.14;  Mangry=-.25; SD=-.12; Mno expression=-.35; SD=.12; 
Msad=-.50; SD=.11). Suggesting that blocking interferes with zygomaticus to change, the 
contrast of this linear trend in both experimental conditions is significant (t(30)=1.95; 
p=.061). No differences (all t(30)<1) are found in the level of activation of the zygomaticus 
in the blocked condition (Mhappy=.48; SD=.14;  Mangry=.50; SD=.10; Mno expression=.62; 
SD=.15; Msad=.58; SD=.13). 
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Figure 19. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Zygomaticus. 
 
Our hypothesis concerning the orbicularis oris is that blocking did not prevent its 
change (see Experiment 4).  This hypothesis translated a null effect of blocking over the 
change observed in reactions to different type of stimuli under free mimic. In fact, the 
difference between the patterns of muscle activation (for emotional photos vs. no expression) 
under blocking and free mimicry didn’t approach statistical significance (t(30)=1.68; 
p=.103). 
However, when we analysed the overall pattern of orbicularis presented in Figure 20  
it seemed that there was a flat configuration on the free condition, that does not stand with 
the introduction of the blocking procedure which induced an elevated activity when 
emotional photos were presented compared to the non-expression condition (Mhappy=1.46; 
SD=.80; Msad=1.30; SD=.52; Mangry=1.34; SD=.59; Mno expression=1.05; SD=.52; t(30)=2.07; 
p=.047).  
Thus, although this data is clear in telling us that the orbicularis is not prevented to 
change under this blocking conditions, we should be careful in future studies to raise the 
possibility that the procedure can in same way stimulate this muscle to produce more 
reactions to emotional stimuli. This can happen for one of two reasons: because small 
activation induced by the procedure can stimulate those reactions, or because the observed 
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freezing of the zygomaticus, can in some way be compensated by this related muscle. 
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Figure 20. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Orbicularis Oris. 
 
Our hypothesis regarding the corrugator assumed that this muscle was not prevented 
to change its activity by the blocking procedure.  So its variation would be associated with 
type of emotion presented. So we expected this muscle to be recruited to a larger extent with 
sad and angry faces and that this activity was also observed in blocking conditions. 
Analysing the overall pattern of the various emotions compared to the baseline 
condition of no-expression in both experimental conditions, we found that expected null 
effect (t(30)<1). As expected the pattern of activation is similar for blocking and mimicry 
conditions.  The three type of stimuli produced an elevated activity relatively to the no-
expression both in free mimicry (Mhappy=.14; SD=.16;  Msad=.16; SD=.15; Mangry=.20; 
SD=.12; Mno expression=-.10; SD=.12; t(30)=2.17; p=.038) but not in the blocking condition 
(Mhappy=.19; SD=.13;  Msad=-.15; SD=.12; Mangry=.00; SD=.13; Mno expression=-.11; SD=.18; 
t(30)=.79; p=.433).  
Analysing the specificities of the activation of the corrugator both experimental 
conditions, we found that when participants were exposed to photos of angry expression 
(M=.10; SD=.06.) they exhibited more corrugator activity than the no exposure condition 
(M=-.10; SD=.07; t(30)=2.27; p=.031). Congruently with the analysis presented above the 
effect is not moderated by experimental condition (t(30)<1).  
Regarding reaction to sad photos, we expected the corrugator to be activated at least 
in the free condition. Our results suggest that across the two experimental conditions when 
participants were exposed to sad expression (M=.00; SD=.09) they did not exhibited more 
corrugator activity than the no exposure condition (M=-.01; SD=.07; t(30)=1.10; p=.282). In 
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addition, this effect was not moderated by experimental mimicry conditions (t(30)<1). 
Concluding, although it seemed that blocking was preventing the corrugator to exhibit 
sadness (in Figure 21) that  fact  is that sadness did not activate differentially the corrugator. 
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Figure 21. Interaction: Mimicry x Expression for Corrugator. 
 
Summarizing, in this study we could conclude that corrugator is not being affected 
by the blocking manipulation as it was expected. The absence of interference of the 
manipulation with corrugator is consistent with the fact that priming in Experiment 3 
emerged even in blocked conditions. 
We also found that activation of zygomaticus that followed the presentation of happy 
facial expressions was slighter than the one promoted by the blocking procedure. Blocked 
individuals did not produce an increased level of activation significantly different from the 
control free condition. This absence of difference may be related to a successful effect of the 
procedure or an inefficiency of the happy photo to elicit proper activation on the 
zygomaticus. This means the key for understanding the effects of this manipulation over the 
zygomaticus lies not only in the fact that it activates the muscle, but it prevents changes in 
the pattern of activation across emotional expressions.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that blocking was unable to prevent orbicularis 
change. In addition it may be inducing an increased activity when photos are presented, 
which did not happened in the free condition spontaneously. This is congruent with previous 
data, in Experiment 3, when individuals presented facilitation effects for sad primes were 
even stronger for blocked individuals. We shall think this manipulation may have an 
“activity-inductive” power on this muscle in particular, that produced this effect. Clearly, 
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this manipulation is not acting over orbicularis in the same hyperactivating fashion as for 
zygomaticus. 
 
However, for activations following the presentation of photos of facial expressions, 
the manipulation prevented subjects from increasing their activation of zygomaticus above 
the levels of activity promoted by the blocking procedure, for happy photos. Unfortunately, 
because in the free condition, happy facial expressions weren’t able to increase in a 
significant way, the zygomaticus’ activity compared to the control condition, we cannot 
assume that the absence of increasing in the blocking condition is due to a successful 
restraining of the manipulation. Perhaps this failure to observe the eliciting of zygomaticus 
when happy photos are presented in free condition happened due to the time gap we used. 
That was chosen to match the interval in which we exposed the primes to the subjects in the 
previous priming experiments. Remember that the analysis was focused on 350 to 450 ms 
which is the temporal window in which differential activity emerges. Note that, for 
zygomaticus was only able to exhibit increased activation for happy stimuli compared to 
others only after 400 ms. 
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General Discussion 
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Our work focused on the role of embodiment features such as face muscle activity in 
emotional category priming. According to embodiment framework, affective representations 
are partial simulations of emotions instances (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Among other 
simulations, re-enacting an emotion may involve the activation of correspondent facial 
mimicry. In the present work we postulated that muscle activation can have a role in 
emotional category priming effects and so we expected the priming effect to occur across 
nonverbal (facial expressions) and verbal (a word) representations, which share emotional 
semantic features associated with facial muscular activation.  
Two experiments here presented showed that emotional category based priming 
effects that are, in some features, similar to those of Carroll and Young (2005).  In both 
Experiment 1 and 3, results suggested that emotional faces prime emotional judgments for 
both congruent and incongruent emotional targets, not having any effect on non-emotional 
targets. This indicates that perceiving an emotion primes facilitates emotional judgments of 
emotional stimuli in general. From this pattern of results we infer several relevant aspects of 
the processes underlying priming effects:  
1) The fact that the results didn’t follow a classical pattern of a pure semantic priming 
experiment, lead us to suspect that when it comes to emotion, the mechanism involved is 
much more complex, and have space for an embodiment feature.  
2) Emotions’ common elements (disregarding their valence and category) may be 
relevant to the process. One of such elements may be embodiment features. Emotions share 
muscular activations and that may be supporting the priming phenomenon. The introduction 
of a muscular blocking mechanism helps us to understand whether this emotional specificity 
came from a semantic process or an embodied muscular one. 
Experiment 3, in addition to a general emotion priming effect, we found some 
evidence of category emotional priming effects. The evidence was however qualified by type 
of emotion. Although the effect was clear for happiness, it was absent of anger, and it was 
generalized for sadness. For sadness the incongruent trials were also facilitated. The reason 
for these results could be that only in the case of happiness we could assure the probes had 
the maximum level of association to happiness (100%) and the minimum of association to 
other emotions (0%) the effect was visible with no ambiguity.  
From this data we concluded that: as Rossell and Nobre (2004)  found, emotional 
primes do not have generalized facilitatory-inhibitory effects across all categories of 
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emotion. Happiness opposes to other emotions showing congruence effects, sadness showing 
a generalized priming effect and anger did not impact emotional judgments at all.  
Experiment 3 show that emotional category based priming effects are interfered by a 
facial muscle blocking manipulation (Niedenthal et al., 2001) suggesting muscle facial 
activation to have a role in emotional category priming effect. Although the blocking 
procedure in our experiments was previously used to demonstrate the involvement of 
mimicry in a variety of tasks including priming tasks (Foroni & Semin, 2009, 2011) no 
previous study offered a clear understanding of its impact on facial muscle activity and 
changes. A set of three studies here presented gave us a more full understanding of this 
procedure, shaping the hypothesis of its impact on emotional category priming effects in a 
more precise way. 
Electromyographic measures associated with the blocking procedure (Experiment 2) 
suggested it to have a preponderant blocking impact over the zygomaticus (hyperactivation), 
followed by the orbicularis oris.  Results are not so clear regarding the corrugator since we 
observed an increase of activity in the control condition. Notice that the corrugator is 
expected to be activated when attention calling stimuli enters into play (Cohen, Davidson, 
Senulis, & Saron, 1992) and so its activation may be related to the presence of a fixation 
point in the screen.  The impact of the blocking procedure seemed to promote muscle 
activation (see also Oberman et al., 2007). Thus, a muscle to be “blocked” seems to be 
“activated”. So if blocking does not prevent activation, but instead promotes it, why should 
we expect it to interfere with priming effects?  The only reason would be that, because the 
muscle is occupied in reacting to a stimulus, it does not react to other. This would mean that 
blocking effects may arise because they prevent a muscle to change its states as a reaction to 
a stimulus.  However, as it was shown by our Experiment 4, when subjects are required to 
perform different expressions under blocking instructions they were always able to do so, 
and muscles change their state.  But this capacity of voluntary change may not be associated 
with a spontaneous change, as the one arising due to reaction to emotional stimuli. In fact, as 
our experiment 5 suggested when it comes to activity elicited by perceiving a facial 
expression, blocking seems to interfere with muscle activity (change).  But congruently with 
data from experiment 2, that suggested blocking to hyperactivate only the zygomaticus, it 
was also the zygomaticus that was clearly prevented to change by the blocking manipulation. 
That is, the natural activation of the zygomaticus reacting differently to a happy face with 
regard to other emotional expressions was prevented by its previous activation by the 
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blocking procedure. The muscle simply did not change. Also congruently with the idea that 
blocking only clearly acts over zygomaticus (suggested by experiment 2) nor the corrugator 
or the orbicularis oris were prevented of changing as reaction to sad and anger faces by the 
blocking procedure.  Although it needs more clear support, it seems that the small activation 
of the orbicularis, following the blocking procedure, may stimulate its change as a reaction 
to any face presentation.  
This knowledge about how muscle react to blocking procedure allowed us a clearer 
test of how the procedure should interfere with priming effect if it depends upon 
embodiment features. 
   The first important understanding is that blocking in our Experiment 3, was not 
expected to eliminate all priming effects. Blocking was only expected to eliminate happiness 
priming effects. And this is what happened. Priming happiness effects disappeared in 
blocking conditions. As expected knowing the pattern of muscle activation under blocking 
conditions, blocking did not prevent priming effects associated with sadness or anger. On the 
contrary, it seems to facilitate them. Remember that in experiment 5, we registered greater 
changes of activity in orbicularis oris in the blocking condition than in the control condition, 
suggesting that the manipulation induced activity that may have been capitalized to perceive 
negative primes in experiment 3. This is in fact what seems to happen, since the effect of 
negative primes seemed to be stronger under blocking than in free condition.  The 
pronounced facilitation for anger and sadness may be because these muscles have a level of 
activation that stimulates reactions, or because other mechanisms such as the elimination of 
feedback from happiness should leave more resources for other facial embodiments to take 
place, namely the ones concerning different emotions. So, future studies would have to 
carefully attend to the possibility that blocking has different meaning for different muscles. 
It may activate them, and it may prevent it from change or by the contrary facilitate its 
changes. 
Several methodological flaws should be overcome in future studies, in order to make 
data more clear.  Power seems to be relevant to detect emotion category priming effect, and 
so, not only number of participants should be higher as other procedures should be taken to 
maximize effects size. Critical trials should be in higher number than  we had.  In our studies 
we only used four in each emotion. This was motivated by the difficulty to find words that 
established clear association with one and only one emotion.  
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The fact that we found few target words mostly associated to a single emotion, had 
implications in the design we chose for the experiment. This led us to decide using a number 
of prime-target pairs as few as possible. For this reason we converted the emotion of the 
prime into a between factor. As this would make the task being monotonous and predictable 
for the participants, filler trials with other primed emotions have been intermerged. A 
limitation of this design was the fact that there were, for each participant, targets that 
consistently established stronger associations to a certain emotion than the targets of the 
other emotions. This could have made the decisions, concerning relevant targets in a 
condition, more simple, to a point that made more difficult for us to detect differences 
between relevant emotions, between conditions.  
In order to apply a more parsimonious design that does not arise this kind of 
limitations, is not only relevant to find words that are tightly associated with the relevant 
emotion, but also that have the minimal associations to other different emotion, so that a full 
within design can be applied. As previously referred minimizing this overlap between 
emotions should decrease the emergence of this general emotion priming effect, allowing the 
observation of emotional specificity.  
Another problem arising from our analysis is that we collapsed all congruent trials of 
every emotion and all incongruent trials also for every emotion. So, trials concerning 
positive emotions and negative emotions were analysed together. Literature have shown 
already that different emotions can have different behaviours in terms of priming effects. 
The collapsing into a group of “congruent” and “incongruent” could be merging effects that 
can really differ. This could also be the reason for the emergence of the general effect above 
the emotional specificity. 
Muscle measurement procedures must be carefully attended to, since they produced a 
lot of noise in our data. Different muscles do not react in the same time window and to 
different stimuli in the same way. For example,  the  activation of the zygomaticus only starts 
around 400ms, but we had to measure the activity between 350 and 450 ms, in order to 
capture the early activation of the corrugator (that starts around 300ms), and to avoid the 
artifacts related to the preparation of the response to the probes (that start at 500ms). It could 
be, thus, the case that the interval was not able to fully capture the triggering of the 
zygomaticus in some of our studies. And time windows on orbicularis oris, should be further 
explored, to discard the possibility of the absence of variation in no exposure condition 
(Experiment 5) be due to the graphic stimuli used. 
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Summarizing… 
Our studies furnish evidence of category emotion priming effects. 
The processing of emotions is different from the processing of valence and the 
processing or simple semantic category priming. Not pure category priming emerges, but 
also a general emotion component appears. Also supporting this view that a pure semantic 
view is not adequate is the fact that there is not a similitude in the way negative emotions are 
processed. In the particular case of sadness various results have been found. Future studies in 
priming should see why sadness can have so different behaviours.  For example in Matthews 
and Southall (1991) sadness  priming effect occurs in a similar way than other emotions, in 
Rossel and Nobre (2004) sadness seems to slow down reaction times for congruent trials.  
Finally in our study, although there seems to be slower results for congruent sad trials, also a 
general priming effect occurs over all targets, meaning that at least it had a facilitating 
impact in the detection of happiness and anger. The fact that sadness is closely associated to 
slowing makes us suspect that different embodied component may be involved here, other 
than facial expressions. Supporting this view Reed (2002) indicates that facial expression is 
not the prominent embodiment for sadness, but it is more internally experienced. Studies 
inducing different rhythms in a previous procedural priming fashion would be a good idea to 
test sadness responding accuracy rather than reaction times. 
We could observe in our studies that semantic association to different emotions 
overlapped. This association level concerns the degree of relatedness within the semantic 
network. However face has also a degree of overlap in the activation of facial muscles that 
should be in the root of our general priming effect. The third study is also clear in suggesting 
facial muscle activity to have a role in emotion category priming effects. At least for happy 
trials. The fact that the effects of sadness and anger were highlighted in a blocking condition 
remains partially unexplained. Our results are congruent with the idea that the manipulation 
stimulates orbicularis in a way that promotes its variation instead of freezing its activity as 
in the case of zygomaticus. However, in the case of sadness, as we said above, facial 
expression is not the most relevant embodiment, nor the blocking mechanism is especially 
effective on it. So the stronger priming effect may be related to the fact that not only this 
embodiment is activated but also because happiness is inhibited. For this reason, a future 
study that separates these two sources of muscular feedback would be desirable.  
Another point of interest of our results is that indeed, priming can be explained by a 
muscular mechanism. Above, we made clear that the fact that embodied cognition can 
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account for task dependence issues is an advantage over spread of activation account. As 
those models have some trouble in explaining priming effects that do not involve evaluative 
tasks, a way to discard those would be demonstrating the effect of simulation in a task that 
does not involve an evaluative component but at the same time could trigger embodied 
simulation of meaning in a difficult lexical decision task (using pseudowords) that required 
access to meaning rather than allowing participants to make decisions based on simple 
phonological routes. 
In addition, our studies clarify the effects of Nidenthal et al.’s (2001) blocking 
procedure in facial muscle activity.  Once this manipulation was shown to only impact 
muscles in the lower part of the face, it would be interesting in future approaches, to find 
other manipulations that could block the activity in a selective way, and that could exclude 
chemical alternatives as botox, which raise the issue of invasiveness of the procedures, that 
can have unpredictable behavioural consequences. 
Although our studies suggested that the disruption of the priming pattern for 
happiness occurs because the blocking manipulation activates at a greater extent the 
zygomaticus, Oberman and colleagues (2007) suggested that this occurs because the 
manipulation creates a great amount of activity that would disturb the perception of emotions 
that produce greater general activity as happiness. However, Oberman’s hypothesis is less 
sharp in explaining why we obtained the results we had for anger. Applying the same 
reasoning, for anger, which was the emotion that created the greater amount of general 
activity in our studies, we couldn’t find a match. As we observed, the priming effects in this 
case were highlighted instead of being disturbed. For this reason it would be interesting to 
have a study that tests directly these two opposite hypothesis. 
Another relevant issue is to further explore whether blocking procedures operate 
through a process of hyperactivating muscles or through preventing muscles to change their 
state (not allowing variability in the amount of muscular activity). If muscle’s change is the 
informative bit, varying the level of pressure imposed by teeth of the pen,  in the blocking 
manipulation, should lead to equivalent results in a priming task. On contrary, if level of 
activation is relevant, then we should find differences between different amounts of 
muscular activation. Another relevant point is to capture if is there any threshold responsible 
for informing the individual what is a natural smile or a noisy  activation of the zygomaticus. 
Giving that the manipulation allows voluntary change, it maybe that blocking could be 
associated to a difficulty in the perception of spontaneous change and not to actual change. It 
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would also be important to study the amount of activity involved in inducing a smile and 
which properties others than the amount of activity make them have a different behavioural 
impact. What could also help the individual to distinguish between an increasing of 
activation promoted by blocking and an elevated activation in smile would be the pattern of 
muscles around the mouth that are activated. When manipulation is used this would result in 
an unrecognizable pattern, that doesn’t match the activation pattern of a smile, leading the 
individual to signal an abnormal occurrence that should not be labelled as a smile. 
 
The literature on the representation and processing of emotion concepts is not yet a 
large one, and most of the accounts assume that emotion concepts are represented as amodal 
symbols. The embodied simulation account which guided our present research appears to be 
a suitable alternative for those models. This is because spread of activation accounts is not 
able to explain why blocking procedures can have a detrimental effect in performance. In 
amodal accounts the only thing that predicts the efficiency of priming is the strength of the 
association between concepts. For this reason our findings add support to the previous 
evidence for the involvement of facial expressions in emotion recognition to processing of 
emotion words (Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman et al., 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2009). 
Present findings assure us that the blocking procedure only clearly hyperactivates 
zygomaticus, it was on the emotion associated with this muscle that we interfere with 
priming.  We are however aware that more research is needed to clarify the full mechanism 
through which priming emotions occurs, speacially in the case of negative emotions. 
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Appendix A: Pre-testing emotional and non-emotional targets 
 
This pre-test had the aim to access the levels of association of a variety of words to 
three specific emotions (happiness, sadness and anger). These words would integrate the first 
two experiments of this thesis, which required us to manipulate the association of words to 
one of the three specific emotions and with minimal associations to the others.  
Given that our experiment would require rapid responses, and would use as 
dependent measure the reactions times of those responses it was of the greatest importance 
to control factors the would interfere with the reading times, so they don’t confound our 
data. Two main factors that may have this impact are familiarity and the length of words 
(measured in number of letters). For this reason, in addition to pre-testing emotion levels of 
association it was also important to pre-test familiarity of those words and registered the 
number of letters per word, so that we could control the stimuli for this variables. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and six volunteers of Universidade Lusófona (75,3% women; 
Mage=22,46; SD=5.34) received a list of words they were required to rate.  
 
Material 
The pre-tested words were taken from several databases as  Nelson, McEvoy & 
Schreiber  data base and ANEW, database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) and Garcia-Marques’ 
Norms (2003) . Non-emotional words, were also taken from those databases, however, were 
words which revealed scores in terms of valence which were around the midpoint of the 
scales of each database. The pre-tested list was composed by 114 word for each type of word 
(happy, sad, angry and neutral), totalizing 456 words.  
All 456 words were randomly distributed to four different lists. For each list of 114 
words, we generated four different random orders with the help of www.randomizer.org. 
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Procedure 
Three groups of 64 Participants were asked whether each word was associated to a 
specific emotion “Is this word associated to happiness?”.  The participants had to fill in the 
yes or no box that was presented in front of the word. This question required a yes or no 
response. “ This emotion could be happiness, sadness or anger. A group of 64 participants 
was questioned about “How familiar was each word” (1- Not very familiar; 5 – Very 
familiar). The number of letters of each word was registered. Each word was evaluated in 
each dimension around 16 times. 
 
Results 
For every word was computed the percentage of association to each emotion. This 
percentage was the number of individuals who reported that the word was associated to a 
specific emotion over the number of individuals who were asked about the existence of this 
association. 
 
Table1 
Sellection criterions 
 
  Association (%) to an emotion  
  Happiness Anger Sadness  
Happiness >75% <50% <50%  
Anger <50% >75% <50%  
Sadness <50% <50% >75%  
Words 
Neutral <50% <50% <50%  
 
After selecting a group of stimuli that met the above criterions, we were interested in 
selecting a subset for each type of emotion (happy, sad, angry and neutral) eight stimuli that 
should be equilibrated in terms number of letters, and familiarity. Because it was difficult to 
select from the remaining stimuli, words with roughly the same ratings for familiarity and 
number of letters, we selected the stimuli so that compensate each other between the groups, 
revealing no differences in an Analysis of variance for each emotional group. 
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Word Selection by Emotional category  
Table 2 
Words for Anger category 
 
  Letters   
Proportion of Association 
to Emotions  Familiarity 
     Happiness Anger Sadness    CI (95%)   
  N   P P P  M LL UL SD 
murro (punch) 5  0 0,75 0,25  5,17 3,64 6,7 2,41 
furibundo (raging) 9  0 0,75 0,38  4,42 2,76 6,07 2,61 
enfurecido (furious) 10  0 0,75 0,5  4,75 3,34 6,16 2,22 
feroz (fierce) 5  0,08 0,77 0,25  5,22 3,56 6,89 2,17 
mau (bad) 3  0 0,77 0,5  5,9 4,66 7,14 1,73 
bomba (bomb) 5  0 0,83 0,38  5,42 4,1 6,73 2,07 
zaragata (fight) 8  0,08 0,85 0,5  4,11 2,17 6,05 2,52 
irritante (irritating) 9  0 0,92 0,5  5,7 4,63 6,77 1,49 
 
 
Table 3 
Words for Sadness category 
 
  Letters   
Proportion of association 
to emotions  Familiarity 
     Happiness anger sadness    CI (95%)   
  N   P P P  M LL UL SD 
arruinado (ruined) 9  0 0,36 0,92  3,82 2,29 5,34 2,27 
vagabundo (homeless)  9  0 0,25 1  4,67 2,67 6,66 2,6 
lamento (regret) 7  0,1 0,27 1  4,64 3,28 5,99 2,01 
desânimo 
(disencouragement)  8  0 0,36 1  4,73 3,32 6,14 2,1 
adeus (goodbye)   5  0,17 0,42 1  6,11 4,81 7,41 1,69 
cancro (cancer) 6  0 0,45 1  4,82 3,29 6,34 2,27 
lágrima  (tear) 7  0 0,45 1  4,91 3,85 5,97 1,58 
depressão  (depression) 9  0 0,5 1  6,17 5,36 6,97 1,27 
 
 
Table 4 
Words for Hapiness Category 
 
  Letters   
Proportion of association to 
emotions  Familiarity 
     Happiness Anger Sadness    CI (95%)   
  N   P P P  M LL UL SD 
férias (vacation) 6  1 0 0  5,78 4,52 7,04 1,64 
prenda (gift) 6  1 0 0  6,42 5,78 7,05 1 
alegre (cheerful) 7  1 0 0  6,6 5,91 7,29 0,97 
galhofa (frolic) 7  1 0 0  4,92 3,58 6,26 2,11 
paraíso (paradise) 7  1 0 0  5,67 4,34 7 1,73 
harmonia  (harmony) 8  1 0 0  6,56 5,88 7,23 0,88 
bem-estar (well-being) 9  1 0 0  6,56 5,88 7,23 0,88 
gratificação  
(gratification) 12  1 0 0  4,67 3,39 5,94 1,66 
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Table 5 
Words for Neutral Category 
 
  Letters   
Proportion of association to 
emotions  Familiarity 
     Happiness Anger Sadness    CI (95%)   
  N   P P P  M LL UL SD 
zip (zipper) 3  0 0 0  3,82 2,1 5,54 2,56 
rolo (roll) 4  0,08 0,08 0  4,67 2,6 6,74 2,69 
diagrama (diagram) 8  0,1 0 0  4,27 2,93 5,62 2 
tinteiro (tonner) 8  0,1 0,09 0  5,18 3,88 6,49 1,94 
paralelo (paralell) 8  0,1 0 0,08  5,18 3,63 6,74 2,32 
tabuleiro (tray) 9  0,1 0 0  4,64 3,35 5,92 1,91 
protótipo (prototype) 9  0,1 0,09 0  5,36 4,4 6,33 1,43 
recipiente (recipient) 10  0 0 0  4,73 3,05 6,4 2,49 
 
Apart from those critical words we selected, we also were interested in drawing from 
this pool, ambiguous 32 filler words to integrate Experiment 1. Those words were selected 
taking in account they should have also a maximum of association to one emotion and a 
minimum to the remaining emotions. However they had higher associations to the remaining 
emotions, raging from (above 50%) to more than one emotion and didn’t obey any criterium 
of  familiarity or number of letters. 
 
Word levels of association to each emotion. We tested the levels of association of 
three groups of words (happy, sad and angry) to each emotion in separate. Firstly we tested 
the differences of the four groups of words in terms of variable level association to 
happiness. The one-way anova revealed that there was one difference at least between the 
tested groups (F(3, 28)=958.13; p=.000; η2=.99) 
We concluded the words selected to be in the group of happy words exhibited the 
highest mean (M=1.00; SD=.02) for this variable. Post-hoc compairions (LSD Test) revealed 
that this mean was significantly different from remaining mean level of association of the 
other groups of words such as angry words (M=.02; SD=.02; p<.000), sad words (M=.04; 
SD=.02; p<.000) or neutral words (M=.07; SD=.02; p<.000). 
The one-way aNOVA revealed that there was one difference at least between the 
tested groups for the level of association to anger (F(3, 28)=319.82; p=.000; η2=.97). We 
concluded the words selected to be in the group of angry words exhibited the highest mean 
(M=.80; SD=.02) for the level of association to anger. This mean was significantly different 
from remaining mean level of association of the other groups of words such as happy words 
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(M=.00; SD=.02; p<.000), sad words (M=.38; SD=.02;  p<.000) or neutral words (M=.03; 
SD=.02; p<.000). 
 
The one-way anova revealed that there was one difference at least between the tested 
groups for the level of association to sadness (F(3, 28)=494.81; p<.000; η2=.98). We 
concluded the words selected to be in the group of angry words exhibited the highest mean 
(M=.99; SD=.02) for the variable: “level of association to sadness”. This mean was 
significantly different from remaining mean level of association of the other groups of words 
such as happy words (M=.00; SD=.02; p<.000), angry words (M=.41; SD=.02; p<.000) or 
neutral words (M=.01; SD=.02; p<.000). 
In terms of the mean number of letters that each group of words had, it was desirable 
that no difference occurred between groups. That was what we verified (F(3, 28)=.31; 
p=.821; η2=.03). 
In terms of the mean level of familiarity it was also desearble that no differences 
emerged. However, in this case, there were at least a difference between the groups of 
different words (F(3, 28)=4.34; p=.012; η2=.32). Happy and Neutral words differed  in their 
level of familiarity, being happy words (M=5.89;SD=.24) more familiar than controls 
(M=4.73;SD=.24; p=.002), and more familiar than angry (M=5.09;SD=.24; p=.025) and sad 
words (M=4.98;SD=.24; p=.012). 
 
Discussion 
 
Each group of emotional words  revealed significant higher levels of association to 
the emotion they were assigned to represent. As expected the number of letters didn’t differ 
from group to group, so any differences found in experiments that involve this stimuli found 
should not be attributed to the length of the string of letters. 
Familiarity levels between groups revealed no difference excepting for happy and 
controls. This two groups revealed differences. This could have an influence in terms of 
reading times for happy words compared to the controls in the main experiments, increasing 
an existing priming effect. 
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Appendix B: Pre-testing of emotional face primes 
 
Given the universality of facial expressions, we decided to randomly pre-select the 48 
faces of different people from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database - KDEF 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Although we had already the 48 stimuli needed to the 
priming phase of experiment 1 of the thesis, we needed to equilibrate the intensity and 
familiarity of facial expression across the four groups of words that this faces would prime. 
Both this factors could have a differential impact in the priming task if not well equilibrated 
across conditions. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty-four ISCTE’s volunteers (85% women; Mage=21.16; SD=4.65) were asked to 
rate photos of facial expressions. 
 
Material  
16 individual’s were selected from the The total set of Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces database - KDEF (Lundqvist et al., 1998). For each individual we selected 
their photos expressing happy, sad and angry expressions. On total, we drawn from the 
database 48 photos, divided in three groups of 16 of them expressing happiness, sadness and 
anger. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was presented as a pre-test of characteristics of the photos of certain 
individuals. The participants were asked to evaluate 48 black and wight photos (5x5cm) 
delivered by E-Prime v1.9 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., PA, USA) (Schneider et al., 
2002), according to a duration of 500ms. The evaluation involved rating the photos in terms 
of  intensity of the facial expression they presented and the familiarity of the face, which are 
variables hat could interfere with processing time of the stimuli during the main experiment. 
For each emotional expression we asked “How intense was this facial expression?” (1- Not 
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very intense; 7 – Very intense),  “How familiar was the face to the participant” (1- Not very 
familiar; 7 – Very familiar). 
 
Results and Discussion 
The above tables express the resulting evaluations for intensity of facial expressions 
and familiarity of the individual. 
Table 1 
Stimuli evaluations: sad faces (ascending order for emotional intensity) 
 
  Intensity   Familiarity 
   CI (95%)       CI (95%)   
  M LL UL SD   M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
3,33 1,95 4,72 1,80  1,89 0,99 2,79 1,17 
 
 
 
3,56 2,40 4,72 1,51  2,44 1,67 3,22 1,01 
 
 
 
3,56 2,61 4,51 1,24  1,56 0,78 2,33 1,01 
 
 
 
3,67 2,23 5,10 1,87  1,67 1,12 2,21 0,71 
 
 
 
3,89 2,59 5,19 1,69  2,78 1,30 4,26 1,92 
 
 
 
4,00 3,23 4,77 1,00  3,44 2,28 4,60 1,51 
 
 
 
4,11 2,81 5,41 1,69  2,11 1,21 3,01 1,17 
 
 
 
4,33 2,84 5,82 1,94  1,33 0,56 2,10 1,00 
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 Intensity  Familiarity 
   CI (95%)      
  
CI (95%)   
 M LL UL SD  M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
4,44 3,28 5,60 1,51  2,33 0,75 3,92 2,06 
 
 
 
4,89 4,18 5,60 0,93  2,89 1,59 4,19 1,69 
 
 
 
4,89 3,43 6,35 1,90  1,78 0,85 2,70 1,20 
 
 
 
5,00 3,98 6,02 1,32  2,44 1,11 3,78 1,74 
 
 
 
5,00 3,37 6,63 1,55  1,83 1,04 2,62 0,75 
 
 
 
5,11 4,21 6,01 1,17  3,11 1,76 4,47 1,76 
 
 
 
5,33 4,32 6,35 1,32  1,67 0,81 2,53 1,12 
 
 
 
5,44 4,67 6,22 1,01  1,44 0,89 2,00 0,73 
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         Table 2 
         Stimuli Evaluations: Angry Faces (ascending order for emotional intensity) 
 
  Intensity   Familiarity 
   CI (95%)      CI (95%)   
  M LL UL SD  M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
3,56 2,27 4,84 1,67  1,78 1,14 2,42 0,83 
 
 
 
3,78 2,58 4,98 1,56  1,67 0,65 2,68 1,32 
 
 
 
4,00 2,78 5,22 1,58  2,33 1,06 3,61 1,66 
 
 
 
4,00 2,91 5,09 1,41  2,00 1,23 2,77 1,00 
 
 
 
4,11 3,30 4,92 1,05  3,00 1,28 4,72 2,24 
 
 
 
4,22 3,02 5,42 1,56  2,11 1,14 3,09 1,27 
 
 
 
4,33 3,47 5,19 1,12  2,67 1,23 4,10 1,87 
 
 
 
4,56 3,33 5,78 1,59  2,33 1,25 3,42 1,41 
 
 
 
5,00 4,06 5,94 1,22  1,56 0,78 2,33 1,01 
 
 
 
5,00 4,06 5,94 1,22  2,33 0,84 3,82 1,94 
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  Intensity  Familiarity 
   
CI 
(95%)  
 M LL UL    CI (95%)  
 
 
 
5,00 4,33 5,67 SD  M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
5,22 4,15 6,29 0,87  1,56 0,27 2,84 1,67 
 
 
 
5,67 4,58 6,75 1,39  1,78 1,03 2,52 0,97 
 
 
 
5,67 4,81 6,53 1,41  1,33 0,95 1,72 0,50 
 
 
 
5,89 5,08 6,70 1,12  1,89 0,99 2,79 1,17 
 
 
 
6,33 5,47 7,19 1,05  2,00 0,98 3,02 1,32 
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Table 3 
Stimuli evaluations: happy faces (ascending order for emotional intensity) 
  Intensity   Familiarity 
   CI (95%)      CI (95%)   
  M LL UL SD  M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
2,78 1,71 3,85 1,39  1,56 1,00 2,11 0,73 
 
 
 
3,33 1,66 5,01 2,18  2,56 1,27 3,84 1,67 
 
 
 
3,56 2,46 4,65 1,42  2,56 1,40 3,72 1,51 
 
 
 
3,78 2,16 5,40 2,11  2,33 1,12 3,55 1,58 
 
 
 
4,00 3,23 4,77 1,00  1,78 0,94 2,62 1,09 
 
 
 
4,22 3,02 5,42 1,56  2,11 0,81 3,41 1,69 
 
 
 
4,56 3,33 5,78 1,59  3,00 1,67 4,33 1,73 
 
 
 
4,78 3,94 5,62 1,09  2,44 0,90 3,99 2,01 
 
 
 
4,89 3,65 6,13 1,62  3,67 2,58 4,75 1,41 
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All subjects were able to identify correctly the presented emotions. In terms of the 
intensity of the facial expression, the evaluations of the subjects didn’t differ from group of 
emotional faces, to the others (F(2, 45)=0.81; p=.453; η2=.03). Meaning that no group was 
revealed to have facial expression more intense than the others.  
 
Also, in terms of the variable familiarity, the evaluations of the subjects didn’t differ 
from group of emotional faces, to the others (F(2, 45)=1.39; p=.259; η2=.06). Meaning that 
no group was revealed to have facial expression more familiar than the others.  
 Intensity  Familiarity 
   CI (95%)    CI (95%)    
 M LL UL SD  M LL UL SD 
 
 
 
5,00 3,98 6,02 1,32  2,56 1,27 3,84 1,67 
 
 
 
5,00 3,73 6,27 1,66  1,89 1,08 2,70 1,05 
 
 
 
5,22 3,85 6,60 1,79  2,00 1,06 2,94 1,22 
 
 
 
5,33 4,39 6,27 1,22  2,00 0,85 3,15 1,50 
 
 
 
5,56 4,88 6,23 0,88  3,22 1,70 4,75 1,99 
 
 
 
5,67 4,90 6,44 1,00  2,22 1,15 3,29 1,39 
 
 
 
5,67 4,81 6,53 1,12  1,67 0,81 2,53 1,12 
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Appendix C: Statistics for words and facial expressions per condition 
  
Table1  
One-way Anova: Differences in terms of level of association to happiness for each group of words 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F P η2 
Intercept 2,54 1 2,54 1324,35 0,000 0,98 
Emotion 5,51 3 1,84 958,13 0,000 0,99 
Error 0,05 28 0,00       
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of the level of association to happiness for each group of words 
 
Emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Neutral 0,07 0,02 0,04 0,10 8,00 
Angry 0,02 0,02 -0,01 0,05 8,00 
Sad 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,07 8,00 
Happy 1,00 0,02 0,97 1,03 8,00 
 
 
 Table 3 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in terms of level of association to happiness for each group of words 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Neutral Angry 0,05 0,02 0,024 0,01 0,10 
 Sad 0,04 0,02 0,081 -0,01 0,08 
  Happy -0,93 0,02 0,000 -0,97 -0,88 
Angry Sad -0,01 0,02 0,573 -0,06 0,03 
  Happy -0,98 0,02 0,000 -1,02 -0,93 
Sad Happy -0,97 0,02 0,000 -1,01 -0,92 
Error: Between MS = ,00348, df = 28 
 
Table 4 
One-way Anova: Differences in terms of level of association to anger for each group of words 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 2,96 1 2,96 848,92 0,000 0,97 
Emotion 3,34 3 1,11 319,82 0,000 0,97 
Error 0,10 28 0,00       
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Table 5  
Descriptive statistics of the level of association to anger for each group of words 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Neutral 0,03 0,02 -0,01 0,08 8 
Angry 0,80 0,02 0,76 0,84 8 
Sad 0,38 0,02 0,34 0,43 8 
Happy 0,00 0,02 -0,04 0,04 8 
 
 
Table 6 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in terms of level of association to anger for each group of words 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Neutral Angry -0,77 0,03 0,000 -0,83 -0,71 
 Sad -0,35 0,03 0,000 -0,41 -0,29 
  Happy 0,03 0,03 0,282 -0,03 0,09 
Angry Sad 0,41 0,03 0,000 0,35 0,47 
  Happy 0,80 0,03 0,000 0,74 0,86 
Sad Happy 0,38 0,03 0,000 0,32 0,44 
Error: Between MS = ,00192, df = 28 
 
Table 7 
One-way Anova: Differences in terms of level of association to sadness for each group of words 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 3,96 1 3,96 1128,98 0,000 0,98 
Emotion 5,20 3 1,73 494,81 0,000 0,98 
Error 0,10 28 0,00       
 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics of the level of association to sadness for each group of words 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Neutral 0,01 0,02 -0,03 0,05 8 
Angry 0,41 0,02 0,36 0,45 8 
Sad 0,99 0,02 0,95 1,03 8 
Happy 0,00 0,02 -0,04 0,04 8 
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Table 9 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in terms of level of association to sadness for each group of words 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Neutral Angry -0,40 0,03 0,000 -0,46 -0,34 
 Sad -0,98 0,03 0,000 -1,04 -0,92 
  Happy 0,01 0,03 0,727 -0,05 0,07 
Angry Sad -0,58 0,03 0,000 -0,64 -0,52 
  Happy 0,41 0,03 0,000 0,35 0,47 
Sad Happy 0,99 0,03 0,000 0,93 1,05 
Error: Between MS = ,00350, df = 28 
 
 Table 10 
One-way Anova: Differences in terms of number of letters between each group of words 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 1725,78 1 1725,78 363,66 0,000 0,93 
Emotion 4,34 3 1,45 0,31 0,821 0,03 
Error 132,88 28 4,75       
 
 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics of the number of letters in  each group of words 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Neutral 7,38 0,77 5,80 8,95 8 
Angry 6,75 0,77 5,17 8,33 8 
Sad 7,50 0,77 5,92 9,08 8 
Happy 7,75 0,77 6,17 9,33 8 
 
 
Table 12 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in the number of letters between each group of words 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Neutral Angry 0,63 1,09 0,571 -1,61 2,86 
 Sad -0,13 1,09 0,909 -2,36 2,11 
  Happy -0,38 1,09 0,733 -2,61 1,86 
Angry Sad -0,75 1,09 0,497 -2,98 1,48 
  Happy -1,00 1,09 0,366 -3,23 1,23 
Sad Happy -0,25 1,09 0,820 -2,48 1,98 
Error: Between MS = 4,7455, df = 28 
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Table 13 
One-way Anova: Differences in terms of familiarity between each group of words 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 856,37 1 856,37 1834,50 0,000 0,98 
Emotion 6,08 3 2,03 4,34 0,012 0,32 
Error 13,07 28 0,47       
 
 
Table 14 
Descriptive statistics of  familiarity in  each group of words 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Neutral 4,73 0,24 4,24 5,23 8 
Angry 5,09 0,24 4,59 5,58 8 
Sad 4,98 0,24 4,49 5,48 8 
Happy 5,89 0,24 5,40 6,39 8 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in familiarity between each group of emotional targets 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Neutral Angry -0,35 0,34 0,308 -1,05 0,35 
 Sad -0,25 0,34 0,469 -0,95 0,45 
  Happy -1,16 0,34 0,002 -1,86 -0,46 
Angry Sad 0,10 0,34 0,764 -0,60 0,80 
  Happy -0,81 0,34 0,025 -1,51 -0,11 
Sad Happy -0,91 0,34 0,012 -1,61 -0,21 
Error: Between MS = ,46681, df = 28 
 
Table 16 
One-way Anova: Differences regarding intensity of facial expression between each group of emotional   targets 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 1010,54 1 1010,54 1553,57 0,000 0,97 
Emotion 1,05 2 0,52 0,81 0,453 0,03 
Error 29,27 45 0,65       
 
 
Table 17 
Descriptive statistics of the intensity of facial expression in  group of emotional targets 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Sad 4,41 0,20 4,00 4,82 16 
Angry 4,77 0,20 4,37 5,18 16 
Happy 4,58 0,20 4,18 4,99 16 
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Table 18 
Post hoc test exploring the differences in familiarity between each group of emotional targets 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Sad Angry -0,36 0,29 0,211 -0,94 0,21 
  Happy -0,18 0,29 0,542 -0,75 0,40 
Angry Happy 0,19 0,29 0,516 -0,39 0,76 
Error: Between MS = ,65046, df = 45 
 
 
Table 19 
One-way Anova: Differences regarding familiarity of the facial expression between each group of emotional 
targets 
 
  SS Degr. of MS F p η2 
Intercept 228,03 1 228,03 740,45 0,000 0,94 
Emotion 0,86 2 0,43 1,39 0,259 0,06 
Error 13,86 45 0,31       
 
 
Table 20 
Descriptive statistics regarding the familiarity of the facial expression in  group of emotional targets 
 
emotion Mean SD LL UL N 
Sad 2,17 0,14 1,89 2,45 16 
Angry 2,02 0,14 1,74 2,30 16 
Happy 2,35 0,14 2,07 2,63 16 
 
 
Table 21 
 Post hoc test exploring the differences in familiarity of the facial expression between each emotional targets 
 
          CI 95% 
Condition  Mean Difference SD p LL UL 
Sad Angry 0,15 0,20 0,454 -0,25 0,54 
  Happy -0,18 0,20 0,367 -0,57 0,22 
Angry Happy -0,33 0,20 0,103 -0,72 0,07 
Error: Between MS = ,30796, df = 45 
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Appendix D: Statistics of Experiment 1 
 
Analysis of Reaction Times 
 
Table 1 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 x 3)  
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 10439,45 1 10439,45 19076,94 0 0,998325 
emo 2,46 2 1,23 2,25 0,122139 0,123144 
Error 17,51 32 0,55    
Congruence 0,03 2 0,02 0,18 0,8377 0,005519 
Congruence*Emotion 0,19 4 0,05 0,5 0,738853 0,030054 
Error 6,08 64 0,1    
Prime 0,56 1 0,56 5,91 0,020878 0,155802 
Prime*Emotion 0,43 2 0,21 2,25 0,121828 0,123283 
Error 3,05 32 0,1    
Congruence*Prime 0,59 2 0,3 2,63 0,079871 0,075941 
Congruence*Prime*Emotion 0,25 4 0,06 0,56 0,693486 0,033736 
Error 7,19 64 0,11       
  η2= partial eta-square 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Prime 
 
Condition M SD 
Prime 1197,59 67,03 
No Prime 1352,94 83,72 
 
 
Table 3 
Contrasts revealing an impact of the presence of the, per level of congruence between and prime and target 
 
  Prime   No Prime       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   t(32) p LL UL 
Congruent 1133,56 81,05   1475,00 153,04  2,17 0,037 0,01 0,40 
Incongruent 1194,91 92,71  1374,53 97,70  1,96 0,058 -0,01 0,30 
Neutral 1264,29 83,63   1209,30 81,45   0,71 0,485 -0,08 0,17 
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Table 4 
Contrast of the interaction between presence of the  prime and level of congruence between the prime and the 
target 
 
  Prime (-1)   No Prime (1)       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   t(32) p LL UL 
Congruent (1) 1133,56 81,05   1475,00 153,04   
Neutral (-1) 1264,29 83,63   1209,30 81,45   
2,11 0,04 0,01 0,49 
Incongruent (1) 1194,91 92,71   1374,53 97,70   
Neutral (-1) 1264,29 83,63   1209,30 81,45   
1,97 0,057 -0,39 0,01 
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Appendix E: Statistics of Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of EMG activity (Means) 
 
Table 1 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 ) 
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 1,58 1 1,58 3,53 0,090 0,26 
Error 4,46 10 0,45    
MUSC 0,65 2 0,33 1,21 0,320 0,11 
Error 5,39 20 0,27    
MIMICRY 0,95 1 0,95 1,55 0,241 0,13 
Error 6,12 10 0,61    
MUSC*MIMICRY 13,58 2 6,79 6,30 0,008 0,39 
Error 21,55 20 1,08       
 
 
Table 2 
Contrast revealing the impact of blocking manipulation, compared to free mimicry condition, for each muscle. 
 
  Blocked mimicry   Free mimicry     CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD t(10) p LL UL 
Corrugator -0,40 0,25  0,63 0,22 2,51 0,031 -1,94 -0,11 
Zygomaticus 0,81 0,29  -0,23 0,18 2,52 0,031 0,12 1,97 
Orbicularis 
Oris 
0,41 0,30   -0,30 0,15 1,74 0,112 -0,20 1,60 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Analysis of EMG activity (Standard Deviations) 
 
Table 3 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 ) 
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 0,00 1 0,00 4,62 0,060 0,34 
Error 0,00 9 0,00    
Mimicry 0,00 1 0,00 1,38 0,269 0,13 
Error 0,00 9 0,00    
Muscle 0,00 2 0,00 0,64 0,537 0,07 
Error 0,00 18 0,00    
Mimicry*Muscle 0,00 2 0,00 0,99 0,392 0,10 
Error 0,00 18 0,00       
 
130 
  
  
  
131 
  
  
  
Appendix F: Statistics of Experiment 3 
 
Analysis of Reaction Times 
 
Table 1 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 x 3) – Only Free Mimicry Condition 
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 8595,08 1 8595,08 14689,32 0,000 1,00 
Emotion 1,37 2 0,68 1,17 0,324 0,07 
Error 18,14 31 0,59    
Congruence 0,43 2 0,22 3,89 0,026 0,11 
Congruence*Emotion 0,54 4 0,14 2,46 0,054 0,14 
Error 3,43 62 0,06    
Prime 0,48 1 0,48 6,13 0,019 0,17 
Prime*Emotion 0,21 2 0,10 1,34 0,277 0,08 
Error 2,40 31 0,08    
Congruence*Prime 0,35 2 0,18 3,16 0,050 0,09 
Congruence*Prime*Emotion 0,49 4 0,12 2,22 0,077 0,13 
Error 3,44 62 0,06       
η2= partial eta-square 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Prime 
 
Condition M SD 
Prime 688,43 52,05 
No Prime 772,05 70,37 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Level of Congruence of the Prime 
 
Condition M SD 
Congruent 723,82 69,20 
Incongruent 794,46 74,83 
Neutral 672,42 42,87 
 
 
Table 4 
 Contrasts revealing an impact of the congruence between prime and target, in the priming effect 
 
  Prime   No Prime       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   T(31) p LL UL 
Congruent 659,09 76,07  788,55 67,51  
Incongruent 757,74 69,25  831,18 104,73  
7,12 0,01 0,04 0,33 
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Table 5 
Contrasts revealing an impact of the congruence between prime and target, per emotion 
 
  Congruent   Incongruent   Neutral     CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   M SD T(31) p LL UL 
Happy (-1;2:-1) 638,40 116,39  803,48 125,85  672,77 72,10 2,672 0,01 0,16 1,20 
Sad (1;1;2) 883,67 121,56  984,93 131,44  721,61 75,31 2,410 0,02 0,10 1,23 
Angry (-2;1;1) 649,40 121,56   594,98 131,44   622,89 75,31 -0,931 0,36 -0,55 0,21 
  CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Contrasts revealing an impact of the presence of the, per emotion and considering the level of congruence 
between and prime 
 
  Prime  No Prime      CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD  t(31) p LL UL 
Happy; Congruent 575,88 127,93  700,91 113,54  2,99 0,005 0,07 0,39 
Happy; Incongruent 858,21 116,47  748,76 176,14  0,51 0,612 -0,18 0,30 
Happy; Neutral 592,38 69,38  753,16 96,75  2,49 0,018 0,05 0,48 
Sad; Congruent 780,96 133,62  986,38 118,59  3,39 0,002 0,11 0,44 
Sad; Incongruent 809,70 121,65  1160,15 183,98  1,58 0,123 -0,06 0,45 
Sad; Neutral 717,76 72,47  725,46 101,06  -0,51 0,611 -0,28 0,17 
Angry; Congruent 620,44 133,62  678,37 118,59  1,59 0,123 -0,04 0,30 
Angry; Incongruent 605,31 121,65  584,64 183,98  0,46 0,649 -0,20 0,31 
Angry; Neutral 635,20 72,47  610,58 101,06  0,50 0,624 -0,17 0,28 
 CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 7 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 x 3 x 2) – Adding participants with blocked mimicry 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 15771,8 1 15771,8 14276,17 0 0,995954 
Emotion 1,36 2 0,68 0,62 0,54401 0,020774 
Mimicry 2,01 1 2,01 1,82 0,182315 0,030458 
Emotion*Mimicry 1,45 2 0,73 0,66 0,521916 0,022173 
Error 64,08 58 1,1    
Congruence 1,41 2 0,71 5,63 0,004635 0,088494 
Congruence*Emotion 1,78 4 0,44 3,54 0,009202 0,108744 
Congruence*Mimicry 0,12 2 0,06 0,46 0,631087 0,007905 
Congruence*Emotion*Mimicry 1,27 4 0,32 2,54 0,043723 0,080447 
Error 14,57 116 0,13    
Prime 2,25 1 2,25 20,99 0,000025 0,265698 
Prime*Emotion 0,94 2 0,47 4,41 0,016477 0,132013 
Prime*Mimicry 0,31 1 0,31 2,87 0,095413 0,047204 
Prime*Emotion*Mimicry 1,14 2 0,57 5,34 0,007459 0,155414 
Error 6,21 58 0,11    
Congruence*Prime 0,98 2 0,49 3,53 0,032503 0,057365 
Congruence*Prime*Emotion 1,31 4 0,33 2,36 0,057698 0,075152 
Congruence*Prime*Mimicry 0,05 2 0,02 0,17 0,840095 0,003 
Congruence*Prime*Emotion*Mimicry 0,4 4 0,1 0,72 0,582722 0,024091 
Error 16,13 116 0,14       
 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Prime 
 
Condition M SD 
Prime 682,70 49,91 
No Prime 785,31 55,14 
 
 
Table 9 
Contrast of the interaction between presence of thep prime and the mimicry condition 
 
  Prime (-1)   No Prime (1)       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   t(58) p LL UL 
Blocked (-1) 676,96 72,73  798,57 80,35  
Free (1) 688,43 68,38   772,04 75,54   
1,70 0,095 -0,06 0,74 
 
 
Table 10 
Contrast revealing diference between levels of congruence between prime and target 
 
  Congruent   Incongruent   Neutral     CI 95% 
Contrast M SD   M SD   M SD T(58) p LL UL 
(1;-2;1) 729,70 49,88   788,59 60,40   683,71 56,90 2,97 0,004 0,15 0,76 
 
 
Table 11 
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Contrasts revealing an impact of the presence of the prime, per emotion and mimicry condition 
 
  Prime (-1)   No Prime (1)       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD   T(58) p LL UL 
Happy; Free 675,49 115,00  734,28 127,04  1,88 0,065 -0,03 0,90 
Happy; Blocked 955,96 125,98   829,52 139,17   -0,56 0,580 -0,65 0,37 
Sad; Free 769,48 120,11  957,33 132,69  1,73 0,089 -0,07 0,90 
Sad; Blocked 547,89 125,98   828,18 139,17   5,15 0,000 0,80 1,81 
Angry; Free 620,32 120,11  624,53 132,69  0,07 0,943 -0,47 0,50 
Angry; Blocked 527,04 125,98   738,02 139,17   2,87 0,006 0,22 1,23 
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Appendix G: Statistics of Experiment 4 
 
Analysis of EMG activity 
 
Table 1 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 x 3) 
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 0,00 1 0,00 -4,97 1,000 -0,82
Error 0,00 11 0,00  
Muscle 0,00 2 0,00  
Error 0,00 22 0,00  
Mimicry 10,78 1 10,78 13,75 0,003 0,56
Error 8,62 11 0,78  
Expression 15,76 2 7,88 24,89 0,000 0,69
Error 6,97 22 0,32  
Muscle*Mimicry 9,40 2 4,70 16,50 0,000 0,60
Error 6,27 22 0,28  
Muscle*Expression 47,08 4 11,77 37,83 0,000 0,77
Error 13,69 44 0,31  
Mimicry*Expression 0,68 2 0,34 2,08 0,149 0,16
Error 3,63 22 0,16  
Muscle*Mimicry*Expression 0,59 4 0,15 1,11 0,365 0,09
Error 5,88 44 0,13     
η2= partial eta-square 
 
 
Table 2 
Contrasts revealing differences of general facial activity between emotional expressions in free mimicry 
 
Frown  No expression  Smile    CI 95% 
M SD  M SD  M SD contrast t(11) p LL UL 
0,18 0,10  -0.56 0,06  -0,30 0.09 1 -2 1 6,38 0,000 1,95 4.01 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Table 3  
Contrasts revealing main effect of emotional expressions on general facial activity (linear trend) 
 
Frown  No expression  Smile    CI 95% 
M SD  M SD  M SD contrast t(11) p LL UL 
0,33 0,06  - 0,33 0,06  -0,01 0,04 0 -1 1 6,06 0,000 2,53 5,41 
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Table 4 
Contrasts revealing an impact of facial expression over each muscle 
 
  Frown   No 
expression 
Smile       CI 95% 
Condition M SD   M SD  M SD contrast t(11) p LL UL 
Zygomaticus -0,12 0,07  -0,28 0,07 0,40 0,12 0 -1 1 3,76 0,003 0,57 2,17 
Corrugator 1,23 0,17  -0,58 0,09 -0,65 0,09 2 -1 -1 7,16 <0,000 5,12 9,67 
Orb Oris -0,11 0,05   -0,12 0,05  0,23 0,06 1 -1 2 3,25 0,008 0,30 1,59 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Table 5 
 Contrasts revealing an impact of mimicry manipulation compared to free mimicry, in no expression condition.  
 
 Blocked mimicry  Free  mimicry   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(11) p LL UL 
No Expression -0,10 0,09  -0,56 0,06 4,83 0,001 0,74 1,98 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Contrasts revealing an impact of mimicry manipulation compared to free mimicry, per muscle.  
 
 Blocked mimicry  Free  mimicry   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(11) p LL UL 
Zygomaticus 0,28 0,10  -0,28 0,10 2,99 0,012 0,45 2,96 
Corrugator -0,06 0,04  0,06 0,04 -1,34 0,208 -0,91 0,22 
Orbicularis Oris 0,44 0,09  -0,44 0,09 4,97 0,000 1,48 3,83 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Table 7 
Contrasts revealing the impact of smile expression over the zygomaticus and orbicularis oris, compared to no 
exposure, when individuals are blocked and free to mimic. 
 
  Smile   No expression     CI 95% 
Zygomaticus M SD   M SD t(11) p LL UL 
Free mimicry 0,02 0,19  -0,53 0,07 2,76 0,019 0,11 1 
Blocked 0,78 0,2  -0,03 0,14 
Free mimicry 0,02 0,19  -0,53 0,07 0,86 0,406 -0,4 -0,93 
  Smile   No expression     CI 95% 
Oribicularis M SD   M SD t(11) p LL UL 
Free mimicry -0,2 0,17  -0,57 0,08 2,83 0,016 0,08 0,64 
Blocked 
mimicry 
0,67 0,15  0,33 0,11 
Free mimicry  -0,2 0,17   -0,57 0,08 
-0,08 0,937 -0,55 0,51 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 8 
Contrasts revealing the impact of frowning facial expressions over the corrugator and orbicularis oris, 
compared to no exposure, when individuals are blocked and free to mimic. 
 
  Frown   No expression     CI 95% 
Corrugator M SD   M SD t(11) p LL UL 
Free mimicry 1,45 0,21  -0,57 0,12 6,59 0 1,34 2,69 
Blocked 1,02 0,19  -0,6 0,08 
Free mimicry 1,45 0,21  -0,57 0,12 -1,81 0,097 -0,88 
0,09 
  Frown   No expression     CI 95% 
Oribicularis M SD   M SD t(11) p LL UL 
Free mimicry -0,56 0,07   -0,57 0,08 0,08 0,939 -0,12 0,13 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Appendix H: Statistics of Experiment 5 
 
Analysis of EMG activity 
 
Table 1 
Repeated Measures Anova (3 x 2 x 3) 
 
  SS df MS F p η2 
Intercept 31,93 1 31,93 3,58 0,068 0,11 
Error 267,76 30 8,93    
Muscle 27,30 2 13,65 1,84 0,167 0,06 
Error 444,06 60 7,40    
Mimicry 117,32 1 117,32 12,90 0,001 0,30 
Error 272,81 30 9,09    
Emotion 2,67 3 0,89 1,97 0,124 0,06 
Error 40,64 90 0,45    
Muscle*Mimicry 95,11 2 47,56 5,68 0,005 0,16 
Error 502,14 60 8,37    
MUSCLE*EXPRESSION 1,62 6 0,27 0,62 0,715 0,02 
Error 78,55 180 0,44    
Mimicry*Emotion 0,40 3 0,13 0,23 0,874 0,01 
Error 51,94 90 0,58    
Muscle*Mimicry*Emotion 3,84 6 0,64 1,30 0,261 0,04 
Error 88,91 180 0,49       
η2= partial eta-square 
 
 
Table 2 
Contrasts revealing an impact of mimicry manipulation compared to free mimicry, per muscle.  
 
  Blocked mimicry  Free  mimicry     CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(30) p LL UL 
Zygomaticus 0,55 0,08 -0,33 0,08 6,18 0,000 -4,69 -2,36 
Corrugator -0,02 0,10 0,10 0,08 0,71 0,483 -0,91 1,89 
Orbicularis Oris 1,29 0,60  -0,34 0,10 2,68 0,012 1,54 11,44 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 3 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the blocking manipulation over the zygomaticus when different stimuli are 
processed. 
 
  Blocked mimicry   Free mimicry     CI 95% 
  M SD   M SD t(30) p LL UL 
Angry (1) 0,50 0,10   -0,25 0,12 
Happy (1) 0,48 0,14  -0,23 0,14 
Sad (1) 0,58 0,13  -0,50 0,11 
No expression (-3) 0,62 0,15   -0,35 0,12 
0,56 0,581 -0,97 1,69 
Angry (1) - -  -0,25 0,12 
Happy (2) - -  -0,23 0,14 
Sad (-2) - -  -0,50 0,11 
No expression (-1) - -  -0,35 0,12 
2,3 0,028 0,07 1,2 
Angry (1) 0,50 0,10   -0,25 0,12 
Happy (2) 0,48 0,14  -0,23 0,14 
Sad (-2) 0,58 0,13  -0,50 0,11 
No expression (-1) 0,62 0,15   -0,35 0,12 
1,95 0,061 -0,05 1,96 
Angry (1) 0,50 0,10  - - 
Happy (2) 0,48 0,14  - - 
Sad (-2) 0,58 0,13  - - 
No expression (-1) 0,62 0,15   - - 
0,92 0,363 -1,04 0,39 
 CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Table 4 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the blocking manipulation over the orbicularis oris when different stimuli are 
processed. 
 
  Blocked mimicry   Free mimicry     CI 95% 
  M SD   M SD t(30) p LL UL 
Angry (1) 1,34 0,59   -0,31 0,14 
Happy (1) 1,46 0,80  -0,36 0,12 
Sad (1) 1,30 0,52  -0,34 0,11 
No expression (-3) 1,05 0,52   -0,34 0,11 
1,68 0,103 -0,2 2,07 
Angry (1) 1,34 0,59  - - 
Happy (1) 1,46 0,80  - - 
Sad (1) 1,30 0,52  - - 
No expression (-3) 1,05 0,52   - - 
2,07 0,047 0,01 1,91 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 5 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the blocking manipulation over the corrugator when different stimuli are 
processed. 
 
  Blocked mimicry   Free mimicry     CI 95% 
  M SD   M SD t(30) p LL UL 
Angry (1) 0,00 0,13  0,20 0,12 
Happy (1) 0,19 0,13  0,14 0,16 
Sad (1) -0,15 0,12  0,16 0,15 
No expression (-3) -0,11 0,18   -0,10 0,12 
0,65 0,518 -0,92 1,78 
Angry (1) - -  0,20 0,12 
Happy (1) - -  0,14 0,16 
Sad (1) - -  0,16 0,15 
No expression (-3) - -   -0,10 0,12 
2,17 0,038 0,05 1,55 
Angry (1) 0,00 0,13   - - 
Happy (1) 0,19 0,13  - - 
Sad (1) -0,15 0,12  - - 
No expression (-3) -0,11 0,18   - - 
0,79 0,433 -0,57 1,29 
Angry (1) 0,00 0,13   0,20 0,12 
No expression (-1) -0,11 0,18   -0,10 0,12 0,68 0,500 -0,38 0,76 
Sad (1) -0,15 0,12  0,16 0,15 
No expression (-1) -0,11 0,18   -0,10 0,12 1,1 0,282 -0,26 0,87 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
Table 6 
Contrasts revealing the impact of angry and sad photos compaired to the no expression condition. 
 
        CI 95% 
  M SD t(30) p LL UL 
Angry (1) 0,10 0,06 
No expression (-1) -0,10 0,07 2,27 0,031 0,04 0,78 
Sad (1) 0,00 0,09 
No expression (-1) -0,10 0,07 0,99 0,329 -0,23 0,66 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
